Comparison of the submarine forces of Russia and the United States. Briefly about the comparison of the fleets of Russia and the United States American and Russian ships

Alexander MOZGOVOY

SCARY "HALBS"

The passage of "Stary Oskol" was accompanied by the accompaniment of Western media, frightening the world with the growing Russian underwater threat. However, it was so during the voyages of the first two "halibuts". Only the accents will shift somewhat. During the transition of the diesel-electric submarine "Novorossiysk" - the lead in the series - the excitement in the foreign media caused the boat to enter the Spanish port of Ceuta on the African coast to resupply and rest the crew (for more details, see the magazine "National Defense" No. 10/2015). British publications were especially zealous. They saw in the actions of Madrid a provocation directed against Gibraltar, the British enclave on the Iberian Peninsula. They say, it is outrageous that a NATO country is providing its services to the Russian warship, which is imposed by Western sanctions like a pack of wolves with red flags. And then there is such impermissible liberalism!

The campaign "Rostov-on-Don" (for more details see the magazine "National Defense" No. 1/2016) caused shock and shock in the West after this boat struck the Kalibr-PL complex with 3M-14 cruise missiles on December 8 last year a powerful blow from under the water against the targets of the terrorist organization Islamic State, banned in Russia. The United States and other NATO countries, not without reason, considered that this was not only an attack on the objects of a criminal gang, but also a warning to the North Atlantic bloc that jokes with Russia are bad, since 3M-14 missiles can be equipped with not only conventional, but also nuclear warheads. parts.

Shortly before the beginning of the transition to the Black Sea and "Stary Oskol" performed rocket firing. On May 6, the boat successfully hit an object at the Chizha training ground in the Arkhangelsk region. A day earlier, a B-262 with 3M-54 missiles struck a sea target with high accuracy.

It should be noted here that in order to save motor resources, Russian diesel-electric submarines of project 06363, after deep-sea and firing tests, make transitions from Barents Sea to Black at economic speed. Most of the way is overcome on the surface, and often in tow. So this time "Stary Oskol" was accompanied by the tug "Altai".

And suddenly a storm arose. But not at sea, but in the Western media, primarily the British. "A Royal Navy frigate intercepted a Russian submarine near the English Channel" under this headline appeared in the publication in London's The Telegraph on 8 June. This topic was amicably picked up by other publications of the United Kingdom, as well as some European and American media. The popular British Isles tabloid The Sun even called the crew of the frigate Kent "English heroes". The commander of this ship, Her Majesty, Commander Daniel Thomas, modestly noted that "the Russian submarine was discovered thanks to joint efforts with NATO allies." Indeed, as soon as the B-262 entered the North Sea, it was “escorted” by the Dutch frigate Tromp. And the "interceptor" Kent has already got the second batch. Meanwhile, UK Defense Secretary Michael Fallon said: "This means the Royal Navy remains vigilant in international and territorial waters to keep the UK safe and protect us from potential threats." In fact, Stary Oskol did not need to make its way to the English Channel to threaten the security of the United Kingdom. The boat could strike with "calibers" along the shores of Foggy Albion, while still in the Barents Sea. And the "English heroes", of course, would not have saved the country. That is, "intercepting" a Russian submarine on the approach to the English Channel in case of hostilities is a useless activity and even, we will not be afraid of this word, archaic, from somewhere in the 60s and 80s of the last century.

There was another aspect to this story. The "interception" took place shortly before Brexit - a referendum on Britain's exit or absenteeism from the European Union. As United Kingdom Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond made it clear (in Theresa May’s office, he moved to the finance minister’s chair): “Honestly, the only country that would like us to leave the EU is Russia. And that says a lot. " That is, the insidious Moscow sent the submarine in order to put pressure on the island residents. And success has been achieved! The subjects of Elizabeth II by a majority of votes said "Good bye!" European Union.

FOURTH BATTLE FOR THE ATLANTIC

But jokes aside, the picture, according to a number of Western naval experts, is bleak. In the June issue of this year, Proceedings, published by the US Naval Institute, published an article by the Commander of the US 6th Fleet, who is also the commander of NATO strike and Naval Support Forces in Europe, Vice Admiral James Foggo, and a leading specialist of the US Naval Center. analysis by Dr. Elerik Fritz. Their publication, which caused a noticeable resonance not only in special, but also in popular media, is called very eloquently - "The Fourth Battle of the Atlantic".

What the authors mean by this is clear. The first battle means a tough confrontation between German submarines and the Entente Navy and the United States, which ended in victory for the latter. Under the second, naturally, is the most difficult struggle of the anti-submarine forces of Great Britain and the United States against the fascist submarines. In both cases, the battles for the Atlantic were accompanied by huge losses in the Allied merchant tonnage. Twice England was nearly knocked down. Anti-submarine warfare required the concentration of large financial and material resources on both sides of the Atlantic. And only the "connection" of the United States allowed London to survive and win.

The third battle, as you might guess, refers to the years of the Cold War. The Soviet Union opposed the most powerful fleets of the USA and NATO with hundreds of nuclear and diesel-electric submarines. And although this battle did not turn into a real war, the United States and its NATO allies, according to the authors of Proceedings, gained the upper hand due to their high-class anti-submarine capabilities. The thesis is highly controversial, since such third-generation nuclear submarines as Soviet nuclear-powered submarines of projects 941, 667BDRM, 949, 945, 671RTM and 971, as well as diesel-electric submarines of project 877 were not inferior, and in a number of characteristics were superior to foreign counterparts. And the anti-submarine weapons of the North Atlantic Alliance cannot be called stunning. The Soviet Union lost the third battle for the Atlantic not because of the technical imperfection of Soviet submarines, but in connection with the collapse of the very country that built them. Here, we believe, is not the place to dwell on the reasons for the collapse of the USSR, but we will only say that among these reasons were excessive military spending that led to the bankruptcy of a great power.

And now James Foggo and Eleric Fritz, along with dozens of other American and Western European naval authorities, proclaim the coming of the fourth Battle of the Atlantic. In an interview with The National Interest, which specializes in United States national security issues, the duo of Proceedings developed their ideas. They argue that "the most serious threat to the US and NATO naval forces in Europe is posed by Russia's powerful submarine fleet and its new strongholds of the deny access system (A2 / AD) in the Kaliningrad region and elsewhere."

Here, the admiral and naval expert resort to somewhat tricky American terminology that has become popular overseas over the past three to four years. Anti-access / area-denial (A2 / AD) - literally translated as "denial of access / blocking the zone." In simple terms, this means that the armed forces of the United States and NATO cannot freely deploy their ships, aircraft and military units in certain regions of the world without the threat of being destroyed. It was first used against China, which has put into service anti-ship ballistic missiles.

DF-21D, which made the presence of American aircraft carriers off the coast of the PRC meaningless, since they are capable of hitting floating airfields at a distance of up to 2000 km. But now, according to foreign military experts, Russia has created the same access denial zones around the Kaliningrad region, off the Crimean coast, in the Kamchatka region, around the Syrian cities of Tartus and Latakia. In our opinion, in these areas there is still a long way to full-fledged access denial zones, but the foundations for their creation are certainly available.

Let's pay attention to the very formulation of the question. If a country cares about its security and builds up its defense lines, then it thereby creates a threat to the United States and its NATO allies. That is, military construction throughout the world should be subordinated exclusively to the interests of Washington and its partners. And nothing else. This is not even a paradox, but paranoia.

According to Foggo, "the Russians are building a series of stealth diesel-electric submarines that are part of a Russian denial strategy." Indeed, diesel-electric submarines of project 06363 are excellent submarines capable of performing a wide range of tasks: patrolling, conducting reconnaissance, striking coastal and sea targets, planting mines, transporting combat swimmers, etc. Obviously, they are able to "deny access" to forces hostile to Russia in certain water areas adjacent to the country's shores. But, in our opinion, in this particular case, "halibuts" are drawn to the "Russian strategy of denying access" clearly by the ears, since it has nothing to do with the fourth battle for the Atlantic.

The American experts did not forget the Russian multipurpose nuclear-powered ships of the project 885 "Ash". "The nuclear submarine Severodvinsk makes a strong impression," the commander of the 6th Fleet states with obvious regret. "The submarines that the Russians have are of serious concern to us," sings along to Admiral Elerik Fritz, "as they are very capable of combat and are an extremely maneuverable tool of the Russian Armed Forces."

A similar view is shared by British Vice Admiral Clive Johnston, who heads NATO's Naval Command. Jane's Defense Weekly, a well-known international military-technical and military-political magazine, quoted a number of his comments on this score. The admiral says that the Alliance is concerned about a record high level Russian submarine activity in the North Atlantic: “The activity of Russian submarines in the North Atlantic is currently equal or even higher than the levels of the Cold War. Russian submarines are not only returning to Cold War level in operational activities, but they have also made a big leap in their technological characteristics and demonstrate a level of Russian potential that we have not seen before. "

PAL SHADOW

However, not all Western naval experts demonstrate such frank alarmist sentiments. There is a fairly large group of experts who do not share the views of their colleagues.

"The Russian submarine fleet, which has been in hibernation for twenty years without sea voyages and money for military service, is beginning to show signs of life again," said Michael Kofman of the Kennan Institute at the Woodrow Wilson Center in an article posted on the CNN website. - Russia for a long time absent in underwater world, which is why most NATO countries either reduced their submarine fleet, or completely abandoned the forces and means of conducting submarine warfare. Relations with Russia were politically irritating, but stable in the military sphere, and the Russian submarine fleet stood at the wall and in many cases rusted and died quietly at the piers. "

It is difficult to disagree with the assessment of the American expert. A similar picture was observed not only in the submarine fleet, but in the Russian Navy as a whole. The Swiss site Offiziere.ch published on December 16 last year a comparative table compiled by Louis Martin-Vizian on the ship composition of the USSR Navy in 1990 and the Russian Navy in 2015. There are minor inaccuracies in it, but they do not affect the overall picture. The table shows that over a quarter of a century the number of warships in the fleet decreased from 657 units to 172, including the number of SSBNs decreased from 59 units to 13, including the experimental Dmitry Donskoy of project 941U, nuclear submarines with cruise missiles from 58 units to 6, multipurpose nuclear-powered ships from 64 units to 17, diesel-electric submarines from 59 units to 20, cruisers (according to NATO practice, the author of the table also includes large anti-submarine ships of projects 1134A and 1134B) from 30 units to 3, destroyers taking into account BOD projects 1155 and 11551 from 45 units to 14, frigates and corvettes (patrol ships) from 122 units to 10, large landing ships from 42 units to 19. Total small missile ships, missile boats and small anti-submarine ships, which tightly and reliably held the defense of the country's coastline, fell from 168 units to 68. The table does not show mine-sweeping ships, landing and artillery boats, but it is known that their number is catastrophic. " collapsed. " Considering that these forces have practically not been updated and are "stretched" into five maritime and ocean theaters (see the US Navy reconnaissance map), it is simply ridiculous to talk about the return of the Russian Navy to the level of the Cold War times.

“The reality is,” points out Michael Kofman, “that the Russian submarine forces today are just a pale shadow of the formidable Soviet submarine fleet, which consisted of hundreds of submarines. Despite all the talk about combat readiness, only half of the Russian submarines are currently capable of going to sea at any given time ... And although the activity of the Russian submarine fleet has grown significantly, at least judging by the statements of the country's naval command, these figures can impress only in comparison with the beginning of the 2000s, when the submarines almost never went to sea. Claims that Russian submarine forces operate "at the level of the Cold War" are, at best, an exaggeration. This is simply impossible. These forces are emerging from a coma, challenging NATO in the Mediterranean and North Atlantic, but they are dwarf in size compared to the Soviet submarine fleet during the Cold War. "

Michael Kofman draws attention to the fact that the construction of Russian SSBNs and SSGNs is lagging behind schedule, "and the entire military shipbuilding program is in question due to Russian economic hardships." In an interview with The National Interest, Kofman paid more attention to the Project 885 Yasen nuclear submarine, noting that the lead submarine of this type not only took too long to build, but was also tested for a very long time: “The first Yasen-class submarine passed sea trials for several years and only this year it entered service. "

It should be remembered that the Severodvinsk nuclear submarine was put into trial operation on December 30, 2013, and on June 17 next year it was officially included in the Russian Navy. However, in March of this year, Vice-Admiral Alexander Fedotenkov, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy, said that this submarine had "completed trial operation." So when did this happen: in June 2014 or in March 2016? It should be noted here that the official statement of the press service of the Northern Fleet dated March 19 of this year spoke not about "trial operation", but about "the completion of the development of the lead ship of the Yasen project." It can be assumed that in June 2014 the boat was commissioned in advance, since the arrival of President Vladimir Putin to the Northern Fleet was expected, and to demonstrate to the head of state and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief an unprepared warship, about the outstanding characteristics of which so much was said and written, the naval commanders felt like that's awkward.

Paying attention to the low rates of construction of the Yasen-class nuclear submarine, Michael Kofman says: “Each subsequent boat is, in fact, being built in an artisanal way. Who knows what characteristics the next Kazan boat will have or the one that will be built after it? Their construction takes so much time that serial production is out of the question. " One cannot but agree with this argument. When the Kazan was laid in 2009, it was said that the boat would enter service in 2014. Then the schedule was shifted to the right - until 2017. Now it is officially announced that the fleet will receive the submarine in 2018.

And yet Michael Kofman sees a threat from Russian submarines. “Of course,” he concludes, “given the shrinking US naval forces, especially in the European theater, and NATO allies' gaps in modern forces and capabilities, even such a small submarine can create problems because it is difficult to track and contain. So the military leaders are right to express concern about today's confrontation and unstable relationship with Russia. ”

NOT UNDERSTANDING OR OVERAGING

The same approach, that is, without understating, but also not exaggerating the capabilities of the modern Russian fleet, primarily the submarine, is also followed by the retired US Navy Captain Thomas Fedyshin. He is a professional naval sailor - served on various ships american Navy, including the commander of the missile destroyer William V. Pratt (DDG 44) and the missile cruiser Normandy (CG 60), was a naval attaché in Russia, and now a naval expert, director of the Europe-Russia research group of the Military US Naval College, which trains senior officers in the United States Navy. In an eloquent article titled “Putin's Navy Is More Than Potemkin Villages,” published by Proceedings magazine in May of this year, Fedyshin writes: “Western experts tend to jump to conclusions about the weakness of the Russian Navy when they argue that the Russians are only bluffing and dust in the eyes. Although much is being done for show, the Russian fleet is still dangerous. " In support of this thesis, he gives several examples. So, since 2009, the flotation of Russian sailors has noticeably increased. According to him, although the TASS news agency is probably exaggerating when it reports that 70 naval warships are constantly on alert in the World Ocean, one cannot fail to note the dramatic increase in the time spent by Russian sailors on campaigns. “Little is said about this, but there are no more conscripts on the new Russian ships and those that perform the most important tasks,” emphasizes the author of the publication. "Thus, the level of training of sailors is growing, which, of course, has a positive effect on the state of the Navy." The number of maneuvers has increased, including those joint with the navies of other states. Last year, the Russian Navy and the Chinese Navy held the largest joint exercises in their history in the Sea of \u200b\u200bJapan, as well as in the Mediterranean Sea.

Thomas Fedyshin pays special attention to the role of the Russian Navy in the Syrian crisis: “In October, unexpected launches of sea-based cruise missiles followed from the Caspian Sea and in October from the Mediterranean Sea. Russian missiles flew over 1,500 km and hit the terrorist forces. "

And here is what the author concludes: “In the end, the Russian Navy has become large and strong enough for Russia to influence international affairs in the surrounding regions. And this gun is capable of shooting at a target ... After analyzing the Russian Navy from the point of view of naval strategy, ongoing operations and the state of shipbuilding in the country, we come to the conclusion that the Russian fleet has returned its status as one of the leading in the world. Its current state is better than at any time since the end of the Cold War. Judging by the classical principles of potential and intentions, the Russian Navy can be considered a threat to the interests of the West - at least in Russia's coastal waters. However, since the Russian fleet is noticeably inferior to NATO forces in the open seas and oceans, it is unlikely that it will conduct serious demonstrations of force or any offensive operations away from its home shores.

CHOICE OF WEAPON

Let's summarize some of the results of the discussion about current state of the Russian fleet. Yes, now and in the foreseeable future, the Russian Navy will not be able to compete with the naval forces of the United States, other NATO countries, as well as their partners in the Asia-Pacific region, either in the number of ships or in the type of a number of classes of surface ships. To fulfill the tasks assigned to the Navy to prevent aggression against Russia from sea and ocean directions, it is necessary to determine as accurately as possible the composition of forces and means capable of reliably protecting the country, especially in the current very constrained financial circumstances. Now there is confusion and vacillation here. For example, in the media, one can often find statements by high-ranking military personnel and figures in the shipbuilding industry about preparations for the construction of nuclear-powered cruising-displacement destroyers and nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. In addition to huge costs and unmeasured terms, this will not result in anything.

For twenty years of the actual downtime of the shipbuilding industry, personnel, many key skills and technologies have been lost. Meanwhile, the fleet is in urgent need of renewal. Suffice it to say that the largest and most powerful Russian Northern Fleet of surface ships received only a heavy nuclear missile cruiser "Peter the Great" and the BOD "Admiral Chabanenko", founded in Soviet times and entered into service in the 90s of the last century. True, this year it is expected that the project 21980 Grachonok anti-sabotage boat with a displacement of 140 tons will arrive.

Russian industry is already capable of serial construction of minesweepers and small rocket ships. The latter proved to be highly effective in the Syrian operation. They not only carry out missile attacks on terrorists, but also guard Russian facilities from the sea on the territory of the SAR. Project 11356R / M frigates turned out to be successful and balanced. Their construction is known to be constrained by supply sanctions gas turbine engines... But sooner or later this problem will be solved. It is required to bring to mind even more advanced frigates of project 22350, as well as corvettes of project 20380/20385. It is the frigates that should become the top bar in the surface naval shipbuilding of Russia. These multipurpose ships are capable of solving all the tasks facing the Russian Navy in the near and far zones.

The bet on super ships is futile. And because we have forgotten how to build them, and because they are insanely expensive, and because, despite all their super-weapons, the US Navy and NATO will be able to cope with them. You don't have to go far for examples. It was officially announced that the timing of the transfer of the Navy after the modernization of the heavy nuclear cruiser "Admiral Nakhimov" was shifted from 2018 by two years to the right. As a reminder, work on it started in the spring of 2014, but the clearing of old structures has not yet been completed. Obviously, it will not be possible to meet the re-equipment of the ship by 2020. We'll have to "steer" to the right again. In the meantime, for the same money, you can build several so necessary frigates and even more corvettes, not to mention the MRK - their account would go to dozens.

As Lenta.ru recently reported, the Russian defense industry and the Russian Navy are considering the possibility of equipping all new generation rank 1-2 warships with nuclear power plants. This trend, they say, is due to the fact that the development and production of nuclear power plants are established in Russia and do not depend on supplies from abroad. As a source told the agency, “we are talking about the creation of a line of unified installations for surface ships with a displacement of 4000 tons (frigate) to 80 and more thousand tons (aircraft carrier), with a capacity of, conditionally, from 40 to 200 megawatts. Taking into account the fact that the needs of the Navy in the next twenty years for ships of rank 1-2 can be estimated at about 40 units, the production of such a number of installations will not be particularly difficult. "

A paradoxical situation arises: they say, because we do not have reliable diesel engines and at present there are no gas turbines at all, let's equip large surface ships with nuclear power plants. Has anyone calculated the cost of this idea? Russia still has problems with the disposal of decommissioned nuclear power plants, and we are forced to seek foreign help, scaring our neighbors that without their assistance we could poison half of the planet with radioactive waste. Finally, did they think about the fact that a warship with an NPP would surf the seas and oceans in fun company boats and ships "Greenpeace" and it will not be allowed in most ports in the world? Therefore, there is no one to demonstrate the flag. With the help of nuclear monsters, you can only frighten foreign inhabitants and shake out of them money for the military spending of the United States, NATO and others like them. As a result, this will lead to the fact that the Russian Navy will not receive ships at all - neither large nor small.

The experience of the Cold War era and the present times convincingly proves that we can only "get" countries hostile to us by submarines. Therefore, the construction of multipurpose nuclear submarines should not take decades, but become strictly rhythmic. "Ash" are really excellent boats (for more details see the magazine "National Defense" №3 / 2015). They should not become obsolete on the stocks.

In March this year, it became known about the work on the fifth generation multipurpose nuclear submarine, which received the code "Husky". Its appearance is still being formed, but it is known that it will become a further development of the Project 885 nuclear submarine and will be armed with the Zircon hypersonic missiles, the tests of which have already begun. It is, of course, difficult to judge the future ship from the computer drawings of this submarine that have appeared on the Internet, especially since this "image" itself may not correspond to reality or will change over time. And yet, it can be used to form a certain idea of \u200b\u200bthe future nuclear submarine. The ideally streamlined spindle-shaped hull of the Husky strongly resembles the Project 1710 SS-530 experimental laboratory submarine, which was once created for research in the field of hydrodynamics and acoustics of promising submarines. The branded Malachite limousine form of the retractable fencing also contributes to an exceptionally "clean" silent flow. The entire nasal end is occupied by the fairing of a large-sized conformal GAS antenna. Behind it covers twenty-two vertical launchers for firing missiles and torpedoes. In this case, each launcher can accommodate several units of torpedo or rocket weapons. They can also be used to accommodate unmanned submersibles and combat swimmers' transporters. The propeller of the boat, again for noise reduction, is in a ring nozzle of the Pump Jet type. The tail rudders are cruciform. One can only guess about the Husky nuclear power plant and electronic equipment. But, undoubtedly, this nuclear submarine will be a highly automated ship - a further development of high-speed submarines of Project 705, which had the designation "Alfa" in the West.

At the end of this month, the laying of the nuclear submarine Perm is expected - the sixth submarine of the Yasen family, and in a year another one, completing the series. Then the construction of Husky boats will begin.

Submarines with nuclear installations in our country and abroad are expensive, even very expensive. Part of their tasks can be taken over by diesel-electric submarines or non-submarines. The first include the submarines of the 06363 project, six of which are intended for the Black Sea Fleet and three of which have already arrived at the place of registration - Novorossiysk. Six more such boats will be built according to a slightly modified project for the Pacific Fleet to "cool" anti-Russian passions in Japan.

And in 2018, at the Admiralty shipyards, it is planned to lay down a submarine of the Kalina type - a fifth generation non-nuclear submarine with an auxiliary air-independent (anaerobic) power plant (VNEU), which will allow the submarine not to float to the surface for several weeks. This will be a quantum leap in the development of Russia's submarine forces.

As we know, Project 06363 "halibuts" can deliver missile strikes at the enemy. But they are able to stay under water for only a few days. That is, these submarines are forced to surface to recharge their batteries and thereby unmask themselves. Even the use of an underwater engine operating device (snorkel) does not guarantee stealth. And only VNEU and high-capacity lithium-ion batteries, or even better a combination of these energy sources, enable non-nuclear submarines to be truly underwater.

If everything goes well, and we believe in it, then the Kalina-class submarines and their modifications should become the most massive ships of the Russian fleet, maybe not as numerous as the diesel-electric submarines of the 613 project (215 units) in Soviet times, but about 50-60 units can be spoken. And then the "wolf packs" of the Russian Navy, consisting of "viburnum", "halibut", "ash" and "husky", will be able to exert tight pressure on the shores of America, the European NATO states and their partners in other regions of the world. This is necessary in order to drive Arleigh Burke-class destroyers with SM-3 interceptor missiles and Tomahawk cruise missiles from the seas surrounding Russia. They will be forced to withdraw to support the United States anti-submarine defense


The modern navy is designed to perform three main tasks: providing strategic deterrence in the form of one of the components of the "nuclear triad", supporting ground forces in local conflicts, and performing "decorative" functions, otherwise known as "displaying the flag." In some cases perhaps :

Participation in international operations (demining of the Suez Canal or Chittagong Bay);
- protection of territorial waters (displacement of the cruiser "Yorktown");

Search and rescue operations (rescue of the Alfa-Foxtrot 586 crew or search for landing capsules of spacecraft that splashed down in the Indian Ocean)

Special operations (destruction of the USA-193 satellite in low Earth orbit or escorting tankers in the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war).

Based on the foregoing, it seems curious to find out how the two most powerful fleets in the world - the US Navy and the Navy - cope with their tasks. Russian Federation... And this is by no means a ridiculous joke.
Russian fleet is still the second largest military fleet, and, oddly enough, is still capable of performing assigned tasks in the near and far sea zone.

The colossal difference in the naval composition of the Russian Navy and the US Navy is primarily due to the difference in views on the use of the fleet on both sides of the ocean. America is a predominantly maritime power, separated from the rest of the world by two deep "anti-tank ditches" of salt water. Hence - the obvious desire to have a powerful fleet.

Secondly - about this they have been burning for a long time - the power of the modern US Navy is excessive. At one time, the "Mistress of the Seas" Great Britain was guided by the "Two power standard" - the numerical superiority of the British fleet over the next two fleets in strength. Currently, the US Navy has a numerical superiority over all the world's fleets combined!

But what does this matter in the age of nuclear weapons? A direct military conflict between developed powers threatens to inevitably escalate into a global war with the destruction of all human civilization. And what difference does it make to the end of the battle between Chinese and American aircraft carriers, if nuclear warheads have already fallen on Beijing and Washington?
At the same time, for local wars, a super-powerful ultra-modern fleet is not required - "shoot a cannon at the sparrows" or "hammer nails with a microscope" - inexhaustible popular fantasy has long found definitions for such a situation. As it stands, the US Navy does more damage to the United States itself than to its adversaries.

As for Russia, we are a primordially "land" power. There is nothing surprising in the fact that, in spite of its many feats and loud words to the glory of the sailors, our Navy has almost always remained in secondary roles. The outcome of the Patriotic War of 1812 or the Great Patriotic War was not decided on the sea. As a result, limited funding programs Navy (nevertheless, this was enough to have the second largest fleet in the world).

“There are two types of ships - submarines and targets,” says maritime wisdom. The underwater component is the backbone of the fleet of any modern state. It is the submarines that are entrusted with the honorary position of "gravediggers of Mankind" - an invisible and invulnerable warship is capable of incinerating all life on the entire continent. A squadron of strategic missile submarines is guaranteed to destroy life on planet Earth.

The Russian Navy includes seven operating SSBNs of projects 667BDR "Kalmar" and 667BDRM "Dolphin", as well as one new missile carrier project 955 "Borey". Two more missile carriers are under repair. Two Boreas are under construction, in a high degree of readiness.

Submarine - sea thunderstorm
Steel eyes under the black cap


The US Navy has 14 such boats - the legendary Ohio-class strategic missile carriers. A dangerous adversary. Extremely stealthy, reliable, armed with 24 Trident II missiles.

And yet ... parity! The insignificant difference in the number of submarines does not matter anymore: 16 missiles fired from 667BRDM or 24 missiles fired from the Ohio submarine - guaranteed death for everyone.

But miracles do not happen. In terms of multipurpose submarines, the Russian Navy is in complete defeat: a total of 26 multipurpose nuclear submarines and underwater cruise missile carriers against 58 nuclear submarines of the US Navy. On the side of the Americans, not only the number, but also quality : twelve boats are the newest fourth generation nuclear submarines of the Virginia and Seawulf types, which are the best in the world in terms of their characteristics. Four more American boats are converted Ohio-class missile carriers, carrying Tomahawk cruise missiles instead of Trident ballistic missiles - a total of 154 missiles in 22 silos + 2 airlock for combat swimmers. We have no analogues of this technique.



The main caliber!


However, not everything is so hopeless - the Russian Navy has nuclear boats special destination - the odious "Losharik" and its carrier - BS-64 "Podmoskovye". The new Project 885 Yasen nuclear submarine is being tested.
In addition, Russian sailors have their own "trump card" - 20 diesel-electric submarines, unlike America, where diesel-electric submarines have not been built for half a century. But in vain! "Dieselukha" is a simple and cheap tool for operations in coastal waters, in addition, due to a number of technical reasons (lack of powerful pumps for reactor circuits, etc.), it is much quieter than a nuclear submarine.

Conclusion: it could have been better. New "Ash", modernization of titanium "Barracuda", new developments in the field of small diesel-electric submarines (project "Lada"). We look to the future with hope.

Let's move on to the sad thing - the surface component of the Russian Navy is just a laughing stock against the background of the US Navy. Or is it an illusion?

The Legend of the Elusive Joe. The Russian Navy has one heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser "Admiral Kuznetsov". Aircraft Carrier or Aircraft Carrier? In principle, the Soviet-Russian TAVKR differs from the classic aircraft carrier only in that it is weaker.

The Americans have ten aircraft carriers! All, as one, atomic. Each is twice the size of our Kuznetsov. AND…
And ... the elusive Joe cannot be caught, because no one needs him. With whom are the American aircraft carriers going to fight in the open ocean? With gulls and albatrosses? Or with the unfinished Indian Vikramaditya?
Objectively, there are no opponents for the Nimitz in the open ocean. Let it plow the endless surface of the water and indulge American pride - until the US national debt reaches 30 trillion. dollars and the collapse of the United States economy will not happen.



But sooner or later "Nimitz" will approach the enemy coast and ... attack sunny Magadan? For a purely continental Russia, of the entire American fleet, only the Ohio strategic submarines are dangerous.
However, in any of the local conflicts, the nuclear supercarrier "Nimitz" turns out to be of little use. Which, however, is understandable - the power of the carrier-based wing of the Nimitz is simply insignificant against the background of thousands of combat aircraft and helicopters of the US Air Force, tearing Iraq, Libya and Yugoslavia to shreds.

And here are also worthy representatives of the class of aircraft carrier ships - 17 universal amphibious assault helicopter carriers / dock ships of the Tarawa, Wasp, Austin, San Antonio types ... Like a promising Russian Mistral, only twice as large.
At first glance, a colossal offensive force!
But there is one nuance: let all 17 of these ships try to land troops (17 thousand marines and 500 armored vehicles) somewhere on the Iranian coast. Better yet, China. Blood will flow like a river. The second Dieppe is secured.

Note. Dieppe is an amphibious operation carried out in August 1942. Three hours after the landing, half of the 6,000 paratroopers were killed or wounded, the allies abandoned their tanks and equipment and evacuated in horror from the coast of France.

Airborne operations using small forces are almost always doomed to failure. And the Americans know this better than we do - they prepared for the war with Iraq for six months, tormented the enemy from the air for two months, dropping 141 thousand tons of explosives on him, and then across the Iraqi border from Saudi Arabia an avalanche of a million soldiers and 7,000 armored vehicles poured in.



USS Essex (LHD-2) - Wasp-class universal amphibious assault ship


In view of the above, the combat value of the amphibious assault "Wasps" and "San Antonio" is not too great - it is useless to use them against any serious countries. And to use such a technique against the Papuans is stupid and wasteful, it is much easier to land troops at a capital airport in some Zimbabwe.

But how do the Americans fight? Who delivers thousands of tanks and hundreds of thousands of soldiers to foreign shores? It is clear who the Maritime Command fast transports are. In total, the Americans have 115 such ships. Formally, they do not belong to the navy, but they always walk in a tight ring of guards from destroyers and frigates of the US Navy - otherwise one enemy torpedo will send an American army division to the bottom.



The Military Sealift Command fast transport squadron. Each is the size of the aircraft carrier "Admiral Kuznetsov"


The Russian Navy, of course, does not have such ships - but it does Large landing ships (BDK) As many as 19 units! They are old, rusty, slow. But they are doing an excellent job with their functions - to demonstrate the flag and deliver a batch of equipment and military equipment to Syria in front of the entire outraged Western world. The BDK has neither normal air defense, nor cruise missiles - nothing but primitive artillery. Guarantee them security - the status of the Russian Federation as a nuclear power. Try to touch ships under the St. Andrew's flag!
Nobody is going to drive them into a real battle - where the 40,000-ton "Wasp" cannot cope with our large landing craft (displacement of 4,000 tons) has nothing to do.

The next important point is that the Russian Navy has only 15 surface ships of the far sea zone on the move: cruisers, destroyers, large anti-submarine ships. Of these, only 4 can provide the squadron's zonal air defense in open sea areas - the Peter Veliky heavy nuclear missile cruiser and three Project 1164 missile cruisers - Moscow, Varyag and Marshal Ustinov.

The US Navy has 84 such ships, including 22 Ticonderoga missile cruisers and 62 Orly Burke-class destroyers.
American cruisers and destroyers carry from 90 to 122 cells of the Mk.41 UVP, each of which contains cruise Tomahawks, ASROC anti-submarine rocket torpedoes or anti-aircraft missiles of the Standard family, capable of hitting targets at ranges of up to 240 km and destroying objects beyond Earth atmosphere. Aegis's unified digital weapons control system, coupled with state-of-the-art radars and versatile weaponry, makes the Ticonderogs and Orly Burkes the most lethal of all US Navy surface ships.



BOD "Admiral Panteleev" and USS Lassen (DDG-82)


15 versus 84. The ratio, of course, is shameful. Despite the fact that the last contemporaries of our large anti-submarine ships - the destroyer of the "Spruance" type, the Americans decommissioned back in 2006.

But do not forget that the likelihood of a direct military conflict between the US Navy and the Russian Navy is vanishingly small - no one wants to die in a thermonuclear hell. Consequently, the Orly Burke super destroyers can only powerlessly watch the actions of our ships. In extreme cases, it is dangerous to maneuver and attack with obscenities over radio communications.

At one time, to neutralize the Yorktown supercruiser (Ticonderoga type), the small patrol ship Selfless and its brave commander Cavtorang V. Bogdashin turned out to be enough - the Soviet patrol boat broke the American's left side, deformed the helipad, demolished the Harpoon missile launcher ”And prepared for the second bulk. No repetition was required - the Yorktown hastily left the inhospitable territorial waters of the Soviet Union.

By the way, about patrol boats and frigates.

The Russian Navy includes 9 frigates, corvettes and patrol boats, not counting hundreds of small artillery, anti-submarine and missile ships, missile boats and sea minesweepers.
The US Navy, of course, has more such ships: 22 elderly frigates of the Oliver Hazard Perry class and three coastal zone warships of the LCS type.



LCS, in every sense, is an innovative thing - 45-50 knots travel, versatile weaponry, spacious helipad, modern electronics. The US Navy is expected to add a fourth ship of this type this year. In total, the plans include the construction of 12 marine super vehicles.

As for the Perry frigates, they have become very weak lately. In 2003, missile weapons were completely dismantled from them. Several ships of this type are annually written off, and by the beginning of the next decade, all Perry must be sold to the allies or scrapped.

Another important point is naval base aviation.

In service with the aviation of the Russian Navy there are about fifty anti-submarine aircraft Il-38 and Tu-142 (let's be realistic - how many of them are in flight condition ?)
The US Navy has 17 squadrons of anti-submarine aircraft, naval electronic reconnaissance aircraft and relay aircraft, a total of one and a half hundred vehicles, excluding the reserve and coast guard aviation.
In service are the legendary P-3 Orion, as well as their special reconnaissance modification EP-3 Aries. Currently, the new P-8 Poseidon anti-submarine jet aircraft have begun to enter service.



P-3 Orion and P-8 Poseidon. Generation change



Long-range anti-submarine aircraft Tu-142, accompanied by "Phantoms"


Even in theory, the U.S. Navy's naval base aviation is second to none anti-submarine aircraft Russian Navy. And this is really insulting. I'm not sure about the anti-submarine capabilities of the Orions and Poseidons (where were they looking when the Pike-B surfaced in the Gulf of Mexico?), But in terms of search and rescue capabilities, the Americans have an order of magnitude higher.
When those who are still able to take to the air for the Il-38 have been looking for a week and cannot find rafts from the shipwreck or an ice floe with fishermen - no, guys, you can't do that.

Conclusions throughout this story will be conflicting: on the one hand, the Russian Navy in its current state is incapable of conducting any serious military operations far from its native shores. On the other hand, Russia is not going to or planning to fight on the other side of the world. All our modern interests are in the near abroad, in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Demonstration of the flag, participation in international maritime salons and naval exercises, delivery of military help friendly regimes, humanitarian operations, the evacuation of Russian citizens from the zone of military conflicts, the protection of the territorial waters of the Russian Federation (where pack ice does not come close to the coast), hunting for pirate feluccas - the Russian Navy can do everything (or almost everything) that it should do the navy in peacetime.



Russian fleet at international exercises
(in the lower illustration - in the head of the second column there is a BOD pr. 1155)



Despite some growth in military shipbuilding that emerged after 2015, Russia has not yet reached the level of 2007, when the combat capabilities of the Russian Navy were 65% of the American ones. According to the naval portal Mil.Press FLOT, over the past year this figure was only 47%. This is more than in 2016 and 2015. (45 and 44% respectively), but still the statistics leaves much to be desired.

This indicator does not answer the question of who will win the war, since with the advent of nuclear weapons everything has become much more complicated. However, the numbers allow us to compare the fleets of the two superpowers and the dynamics of growth.

In 2017, Russian sailors received only two large warships - the Project 11356 Admiral Makarov frigate and the Sovershenny corvette.

Corvette "Perfect". Photo: mil.ru

In theory, the project 22350 frigate "Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Gorshkov" is approaching, which is undergoing state tests. But experts do not undertake to predict when the ship will be handed over to the Russian Navy. Deadlines have been postponed too often.

The problem with the ship of the same series "Admiral Golovko" is even more serious. The frigate never received the engines previously supplied by the Ukrainian Zorya-Mashproekt.

A similar situation has developed with three frigates of Project 11356. Alternative production of turbines in Rybinsk has not yet been established. And the ships will be commissioned at best in 2020-2021. The fate of the large landing ship "Ivan Gren" is also unclear - it was also planned to transfer it to the fleet last year, but this did not happen.

Landing ship "Ivan Gren". Photo: mil.ru

The general situation was slightly improved by the nuclear-powered missile carriers Ryazan and Tula, which returned from the repair docks. But these good submarines from the 1980s. cannot duplicate the new Borey submarines, which should form the basis of the strategic fleet.


At the same time, American sailors received new aircraft carrier Gerald Ford, two Arleigh Burke-class missile destroyers, two Virginia-class multipurpose submarines and three LCS-class coastal ships. In addition, the second Zamvolt-class destroyer Michael Monsour is undergoing testing, although the date of its transfer to the US Navy is still unknown.

Destroyer "Arleigh Burke". Photo: wikipedia.org

But absolutely this year the Americans will receive three Arleigh Burke destroyers, two Virginia-class submarines, a San Antonio-class landing ship and three LCSs.


Russia could significantly improve the situation with the very Mistrals that, due to the sanctions, did not get the Russian Navy. Now ships will either have to be purchased, for example, from China, or built from scratch, which is very difficult.

Coastal Ship LCS 2. Photo: GLOBAL LOOK press / Deven Leigh Ellis

Nevertheless, the RF Ministry of Defense is slowly but surely updating the fleet. So far, it has been decided to abandon the construction of a new aircraft carrier. financial reasons... And all the forces and resources are now thrown into new submarines and frigates, which must be completed at any cost. In addition, we should not forget about the modernization of the heavy nuclear cruisers Peter the Great and Admiral Nakhimov, which are planned to be equipped with the most modern weapons.

Diesel submarines
(weighting factor 3)

Comments on the dynamics of 2016 - 2017

In the main Mil.Press rating, FLOT only accepts combat ships of the main classes of the Russian Navy and the US Navy for comparison. In recent years, China's navy has also been intensively strengthening. But official Beijing is trying to keep accurate data on its shipbuilding program secret, so it is not possible to objectively assess the combat capabilities of the PRC Navy.

This time, the editors made minor adjustments in assessing the combat readiness of the US Navy, making an amendment to the ships that were overhauled and modernized. Thanks to this, according to the results of 2017, not very successful for the Russian naval shipbuilding (the Navy received only two warships - the frigate "" and the corvette ""), Russia avoided a failure in the report card and even slightly improved its position compared to the previous year.

Note that during the same time, the US Navy received the new generation aircraft carrier Gerald Ford, two Arleigh Burke-class missile destroyers, two Virginia-class multipurpose nuclear submarines and three LCS-class coastal zone ships. But two incidents in the US Pacific Fleet played in Russia's favor, as a result of which the destroyers "" and "John McCain" were out of action for a long time.

If we take into account the ships in trial operation, ships and boats of repair and reserve, ships of the auxiliary fleet, we can talk about an almost equal payroll of the parties; at the same time, the Russian Navy continues to be inferior to the US Navy in terms of combat potential by a little less than a third.

7. The indicator is recalculated annually.

2017 for the enterprises of the maritime defense industry

On January 25, the modernized diesel-electric submarine Komsomolsk-on-Amur.

On January 25, at the Sredne-Nevsky shipyard in St. Petersburg, a solemn ceremony of laying down the third mine defense ship of project 12700, named "Ivan Antonov", took place.

In February, the St. Petersburg machine-building plant "Arsenal" announced the successful completion of field tests of the modernized gun mount of 76.2 mm AK-176MA. It is with this gun that new corvettes, small missile ships and missile boats will be armed.

On March 24, the Almaz-Antey concern, which is responsible for the readiness of anti-aircraft missile systems, was accused of disrupting the deadlines for the delivery of new warships for the Navy.

On March 31, in Severodvinsk at the Sevmash plant, the multipurpose nuclear submarine Kazan, which became the first built according to the improved project 885M Yasen-M, was taken out of the slipway and launched.

On April 6, the Zvezdochka Ship Repair Center completed the repair of the Orel nuclear submarine missile cruiser (Project 949A Antey).

On April 20, at the Sredne-Nevsky shipyard in St. Petersburg, the third serial mine defense ship of project 12700 "Vladimir Emelyanov" was laid down.

On April 25, Russian President Vladimir Putin launched tests of the GTA M35R-1 gas turbine unit with the new M70FRU-2 marine engine.

On December 5, at the Leningrad shipyard "Pella", an experimental vessel "Ilmen" of project 11982 was launched.

In December it became known that the Feodosia ship-mechanical plant would be transferred to the St. Petersburg "Zvezda".

On December 25, the third frigate of project 11356 "Admiral Makarov" was transferred to the fleet.

On December 28, Zvezdochka completed the repair of the Tula nuclear submarine.

On December 29, it became known that Severnaya Verf signed a contract for the construction of a new boathouse for the construction of large-capacity ships and vessels.

On New Year's Eve, it became known that the transfer of the Project 22350 frigate "Admiral Gorshkov" to the Russian Navy, the Project 11711 Ivan Gren large landing ship, the ship logistics support project 23120 "Elbrus" and small rocket ship of project 21631 "Vyshny Volochek".

From the editor

The legendary commander-in-chief of the Soviet Navy, Admiral of the Soviet Union Fleet S.G. Gorshkov, speaking about the balance of the Navy, argued that it "consists in the fact that all the elements that make up its combat power, and the means that provide them, are constantly in the most advantageous combination, in which the fleet can fully realize the ability to perform various tasks in conditions both nuclear and any possible war. "

For a number of years, the Central Naval Portal (TsVMP) has been conducting an independent study of the composition and condition of the fleets of the leading world powers, and first of all, the Russian fleet, traditionally assessing its combat potential in relation to the US naval forces.

In its research, the CVMP accepts for calculations only those data that become available in open press: both domestic (military-industrial complex, magazine "Vlast"), and foreign (Jane "s), as well as in electronic media. The calculation of the numerical strength of both fleets was also made with certain assumptions, about which explanations were initially given in relation to support vessels, auxiliary fleet, reserve ships, methods of calculating the combat strength of the Russian Navy and the US Navy The CVMP is not an academic publication and considers possible errors acceptable.

As for the calculation of the combat capabilities of the fleets, here too, the CMCC chose not to follow the traditional methods, deliberately avoiding calculating the combat potential, especially since the term "combat potential" itself has many different definitions. We do not undertake to calculate the combat potential of the Navy and understand the complexity of taking into account the totality of various types of weapons and equipment, control and support systems, and other factors and components of such a calculation. There is a General Staff for this.

TsVMP applied its own calculation methodology, which allows not only to reflect in a tabular form all the diversity of the ship composition of the two fleets, but also to compare their combat capabilities.

Each row of the table is assigned its own coefficient, as in traditional methods of calculating the combat potential, weighted average coefficients are used that reflect the totality of indicators of the combat properties of ships. The choice of the value of the coefficients is not completely arbitrary, but proceeding from an assessment of the totality of the combat properties of ships of one class or another.

The atomic submarine missile carriers, despite their exceptional firepower, have been assigned a coefficient of 0. We deliberately excluded from the calculation the "naval component of the nuclear shield" not only because "they are not supposed to participate in a non-nuclear war," the ratio of the combat capabilities of the Russian Navy and the US Navy.

Readers generally agreed on the choice of values \u200b\u200bfor other coefficients.

The obvious simplicity of the calculation yielded results that make it possible to understand the acute public concern about the state of our fleet.

According to the State Arms Program for 2011-2020 (GPV-2020), adopted at the end of 2010, more than 20 trillion rubles will be allocated for the development of the army and navy, including the construction of 50 surface ships, 8 strategic missile submarines and 20 submarines. , up to 80 ships of the auxiliary fleet.

The tense situation off the coast of Syria and the approaching aircraft carrier strike group of the US Navy are making people increasingly discuss the question: “And if clashes suddenly start, what can the Russian forces do. Colleagues from the business newspaper Vzglyad interviewed experts on this matter. Realnoe Vremya offers readers this publication.

The Aircraft Carrier Strike Group (AUG), led by the aircraft carrier Harry Truman, began its movement towards Syria. The options for how the Syrian air defense will deal with hundreds of cruise missiles launched by this AUG are seriously being discussed. But does Russia (if necessary, of course) have at least a minimal chance of destroying the American aircraft carrier itself? And if so, what is needed for this?

Fortunately, the American strike against Syria is still only a hypothetical possibility. But not only the question of how to keep our ships stationed in Syria is not idle. Residents and specialists inevitably ask themselves: does Russia have the military and technical capabilities to counter such a formidable weapon as the American carrier strike group? After all, it is she who should become the main instrument of the military suppression of Syria, and it is possible that Russia will have to directly oppose this squadron.

“One ship, one submarine cannot do the job for organizing combat operations. It is imperative to create a grouping of diverse forces - submarines, naval aviation, surface ships. By joint efforts it is possible to solve this problem - to disable the aircraft carrier, ”the former commander of the Black Sea Fleet (1998-2002), Admiral Vladimir Komoedov, said in a comment to the newspaper“ Vzglyad ”. Theoretically, it is possible to hit an enemy ship without having such a grouping, but the probability is extremely small. “By chance it is possible - from a submarine, a missile from the shore, from an airplane. In theory, one missile is enough, especially our supersonic anti-ship missiles. But for a serious organization of hostilities at sea, I emphasize, a grouping is necessary, "says Komoedov.

“Theoretically, one missile is enough, especially our supersonic anti-ship missiles. But for a serious organization of military operations at sea, I emphasize, a grouping is necessary, ”says Komoedov. Photo ruspekh.ru

Now in the Mediterranean there are about 15 Russian warships and support ships. They are part of the permanent operational formation - the Mediterranean squadron of the Black Sea Fleet. The main striking force is the frigate patrol ships Admiral Grigorovich and Admiral Essen, equipped with Kalibr-NK missile systems. Diesel-electric submarines of the Varshavyanka project and nuclear submarines of the Schuka-B project are equipped with the Caliber-PL complex. The Caliber can use both missiles for firing at ground targets and anti-ship missiles as their combat assets. It is known, in particular, that the complex on board the Admiral Essen is equipped with anti-ship missiles with a range of up to 300 kilometers.

We should also mention the coastal defense complexes located in Syria: "Ball", equipped with X-35 "Uran" anti-ship missiles, with a firing range of 120 kilometers, and "Bastion" with "Yakhont" missiles - up to 300 kilometers.

At sea the task is more difficult. The Zircon hypersonic missile, which is currently being developed, can also be considered effective means of destruction, and the Granit cruise missile anti-ship missile system is still effective from cash (effective firing range up to 700 km). Surface ships are equipped with "granites" - in particular, the missile cruiser "Moscow" and the nuclear missile cruiser "Peter the Great". These ships are not currently in the Mediterranean Sea, but it is necessary to recall them with such a purely speculative analysis, because Granit is the most powerful anti-ship missile in service with the Russian Navy to date.

Is this enough to effectively neutralize the AUG of the Americans and their allies? According to Admiral Komoedov, it is absolutely not enough. An aircraft carrier always walks alongside escort ships, and such groups include up to a dozen escort ships. It can be cruisers, destroyers, frigates, without fail - multipurpose submarines and airborne early warning aircraft (AWACS) of the "Hawkeye" type. All of these ships are equipped with hundreds of launchers for anti-aircraft, anti-ship and strike missiles, not to mention the main striking force of such an AUG - aircraft carrier-based aircraft.

Surface ships are equipped with "granites" - in particular, the missile cruiser "Moscow" and the nuclear missile cruiser "Peter the Great". Photo fb.ru

Admiral Komoedov points out: “Each US aircraft carrier strike group has a defense depth of 1,500 kilometers. And our range of launching missiles from surface ships and submarines against aircraft carriers is within 300-500 km. "

In other words, the American aircraft carrier group is able to detect any surface ship 1,500 kilometers away (or even more thanks to AWACS aircraft) and almost immediately destroy the enemy at a completely safe distance for itself. At the very least, Russian surface ships do not pose a real threat to American aircraft carriers - they simply will not be allowed to reach the distance necessary to launch missiles.

So the question is complex, sums up Admiral Komoedov. Although, he adds, it is not hopeless. Methods for the destruction of American AUGs were actively worked out by the Soviet military many years ago. “At one time, whole naval operations were planned to destroy the AUG. A huge outfit stood out, especially in the Atlantic: these are maneuverable groups of submarines, and aviation, and surface ships, "Komoedov points out.

In the USSR, the stake was placed on two instruments of struggle. First, these are the already mentioned sea-based anti-ship cruise missiles, the same "Granites". Secondly, air-launched cruise missiles, which were equipped with Tu-16 missile bombers, and then Tu-22M3 bombers. There was a whole class of naval missile-carrying aviation (MRA), which, however, was abolished in 2012.

Theoretically, long-range aircraft should perform the function of MRA today. But in Soviet times, naval missile-carrying aviation had up to half a thousand aircraft, and the long-range aviation of the Russian Federation currently has only 139 aircraft in service (according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies IISS). Russian military expert Alexei Leonkov in his commentary gave an even more modest estimate - 60-65 vehicles. How many of these machines are actually combat-ready is unknown. It remains to add that work on surface targets is only one of the tasks of long-range aviation, and not a priority, in contrast to a specialized MPA.

Can the Russian Navy, based on current capabilities, withstand the American aircraft carrier group? The source of the newspaper "Vzglyad", close to the leadership of the Russian Naval Aviation, like Admiral Komoyedov, believes that this is an extremely difficult matter.

Alexey Leonkov estimates the long-range aviation of the Russian Federation at the moment at 60-65 vehicles. Photo jpgazeta.ru

The greatest chance to complete the task of destroying an aircraft carrier has only the Antey-class nuclear-powered submarines equipped with Granites (and, possibly, in the future, Zircons). But here it is necessary to fulfill a whole range of conditions. First, the submarines must go out to sea and approach the deployment area unnoticed, not intercepted by enemy hunting boats. This is an extremely difficult task. Secondly, there should be several submarines to provide the required number of missiles in a salvo. Thirdly, these submarine cruisers need to approach the target at a salvo range of about 700 kilometers. And finally, most importantly, you need to have accurate information about the location of targets at the time of launching missiles. In other words, attack submarines need external target designation, otherwise the missiles will miss the target.

Now, according to the source of the newspaper "Vzglyad", close to the RF Ministry of Defense, there is a gap in this critical area. However, it seems that in recent years the most important drawback of our Navy - the lack of target designation systems - is beginning to improve. To this end, in the summer of 2017, the development of a sea-based unmanned helicopter based on the Ka-27 began at Kamov. A year before that, another model began to be used - the Ka-35 helicopter complex for radar reconnaissance of ground targets. Previously, our Armed Forces did not have anything similar - and, we note, this machine has already been tested in Syria.

But, as the expert of the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (AST) Sergei Denisentsev noted earlier in a commentary to the newspaper Vzglyad, “a stronger solution” would be to create an aircraft similar to the American Hokai or its Soviet counterpart Yak-44, which has never been was embodied. The creation of vehicles responsible for target designation will make our anti-ship strike forces "sighted" and, therefore, capable of solving this problem.

It could also be assumed that target designation tasks for Russian submarines are capable of issuing A-50U and Tu-204R aircraft, which are also designed specifically for these purposes and are currently operating in Syria.

However, do not forget that these machines will become the first and main target of American fighter aircraft at the first sign of a real attack on the AUG.

Thus, we must honestly admit: in theory, Russia has a chance to hit an American aircraft carrier, but the probability of such an attack being successful is extremely low.

"Sight"

Mikhail Moshkin