Russian Navy vs US aircraft carrier: chances of hitting, but unlikely. Comparison of the Navy: Russia and the USA Comparison of the Russian and American navies

The French Navy has the second largest and most efficient aircraft carrier in Europe, the Charles de Gaulle. The total displacement of the ship is 42 thousand tons, on board it can be based up to 40 aircraft, the ship is equipped with a nuclear power plant. Nuclear submarines of the "Triumfan" type have great striking capabilities; the fleet has four such submarines in total.
The Triumfans carry M4S ballistic missiles with a range of 6,000 km. In the short term, they will be replaced by M51 missiles with a range of more than 10,000 km. In addition, there are six Ryubi-class multipurpose nuclear submarines. In total, according to data from open sources, the French fleet has 98 warships and auxiliary vessels.

5. United Kingdom

Once Great Britain bore the proud title of "Mistress of the Seas", the fleet of this country was the largest and most powerful in the world. Now Her Majesty's Navy is just a pale shadow of its former power.

HMS Queen Elizabeth. Photo: i.imgur.com

Today, there is not a single aircraft carrier in the Royal Navy. Two, of the Queen Elizabeth class, are under construction and are due to enter the fleet in 2016 and 2018. The most interesting thing is that the British did not have enough funds for such important ships as aircraft carriers, so the designers had to abandon side armor and armored bulkheads. Today, according to data from open sources, the British Navy has 77 ships.
The most formidable units of the fleet are considered to be four Vanguard-class SSBNs armed with Trident-2 D5 ballistic missiles, each of which could be equipped with fourteen warheads of 100 kT each. Wanting to save money, the British military bought only 58 of these missiles, which was enough for only three boats - 16 for each. In theory, each Vanguard can carry up to 64 missiles, but this is uneconomical.
In addition to them, the Daring-class destroyers, Trafalgar-class submarines and the newest Estiut-class represent an impressive force.

4. China

The Chinese fleet is one of the most numerous, with 495 ships of various classes. The largest vessel is the aircraft carrier Liaoning with a displacement of 59,500 tons (formerly Soviet aircraft carrier "Varyag", which was sold to China by Ukraine at the price of scrap metal).
Also in the fleet there is strategic missile carriers - Project 094 Jin nuclear submarines. The submarines are capable of carrying 12 Juilan-2 (JL-2) ballistic missiles with a range of 8-12 thousand km.
There are also many "fresh" ships, for example, destroyers of the 051C type, the Lanzhou class, the Sovremenny class, and the Jiankai-class frigates.

3. Japan

In the Japanese navy, all large ships are classified as destroyers, so among the real destroyers there are aircraft carriers (two Hyuga-class ships and two Shirane-class ships), cruisers, and frigates. For example, two Atago-class destroyers boast a cruising displacement of 10,000 tons.
But these are not the largest ships - this year the fleet will include a 27,000-ton Izumo-class helicopter carrier, another one will be produced in 2017. In addition to helicopters, F-35B fighters can be based on Izumo.
The submarine fleet of Japan, despite the absence of nuclear submarines, is considered the strongest in the world. It has five Soryu-class submarines, eleven Oyashio-class submarines and one Harusio-class.
The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force currently has approximately 124 ships. Experts note that the Japanese fleet has a well-balanced ship composition and a well-thought-out combat system.

2. Russia

The Russian fleet has 280 ships. The most formidable are Project 1144 Orlan heavy cruisers with a displacement of 25,860 tons, there are only three of them, but the firepower of these ships is simply amazing. It is not for nothing that NATO classifies these cruisers as linear.

Three other cruisers - Project 1164 Atlant, with a displacement of 11,380 tons - are not inferior to them in armament. But the largest is the aircraft-carrying cruiser "Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov" with a displacement of 61,390 tons. This ship is not only well protected by air defense means, but also armored. Rolled steel is used as armor, and the anti-torpedo three-layer protection 4.5 m wide can withstand the hit of 400 kg of TNT charge.

However, the fleet itself is being actively modernized: it is planned that by 2020 the Russian Navy will receive about 54 modern combat surface ships, 16 multipurpose submarines and 8 strategic submarine missile carriers of the Borey project.

1. USA

The US Navy has the largest fleet in the world, with 275 ships, including 10 Nimitz-class aircraft carriers, no other country has such an impressive force. It is on the navy that the military power of the United States is mainly based.
The Nimitz will soon be supplemented by even more advanced ships - aircraft carriers of the Gerald R. Ford class with a displacement of over 100,000 tons.

The US submarine fleet is no less impressive: 14 Ohio-class nuclear submarines, each carrying 24 Trident-2 ballistic missiles. Three most perfect submarines of the Sea Wolf class, the price of which was exorbitant for the United States, so it was decided to abandon the construction of a large series. Instead, they are building cheaper Virginia-class submarines, while there are only 10 of them in the fleet.

In addition, 41 Los Angeles-class submarines remain in the Navy. The US Navy possesses a gigantic military power that hardly anyone can challenge today. Diesel submarines
(weighting factor 3)

Comments on the dynamics of 2016 - 2017

In the main Mil.Press rating, FLOT accepts only combat ships of the main classes of the Russian Navy and the US Navy for comparison. IN last years China's navy is also being intensively strengthened. But official Beijing is trying to keep the exact data on its shipbuilding program secret, so it is not possible to objectively assess the combat capabilities of the Chinese Navy.

This time, the editors made minor adjustments in assessing the combat readiness of the US Navy, making an amendment to the ships that were overhauled and modernized. Thanks to this, according to the results of 2017, not very successful for the Russian naval shipbuilding (the Navy received only two warships - the frigate "" and the corvette ""), Russia avoided a failure in the report card and even slightly improved its position compared to the previous year.

Note that during the same time, the US Navy received the new generation aircraft carrier Gerald Ford, two Arleigh Burke-class missile destroyers, two Virginia-class multipurpose nuclear submarines and three LCS-class coastal zone ships. But two incidents in the US Pacific Fleet played in Russia's favor, as a result of which the destroyers "" and "John McCain" were out of action for a long time.

If we take into account the ships in trial operation, ships and boats of repair and reserve, ships of the auxiliary fleet, we can talk about an almost equal payroll of the parties; at the same time, the Russian Navy continues to be inferior to the US Navy in terms of combat potential by a little less than a third.

7. The indicator is recalculated annually.

2017 for the enterprises of the maritime defense industry

On January 25, the modernized diesel-electric submarine "Komsomolsk-on-Amur".

On January 25, at the Sredne-Nevsky shipyard in St. Petersburg, the ceremony of laying the ground for the third mine defense ship of project 12700, named "Ivan Antonov", took place.

In February, the St. Petersburg machine-building plant "Arsenal" announced the successful completion of field tests of the modernized gun mount of 76.2 mm AK-176MA. It is with this gun that new corvettes, small missile ships and missile boats will be armed.

On March 24, the Almaz-Antey concern, which is responsible for the readiness of anti-aircraft missile systems, was accused of disrupting the deadlines for the delivery of new warships for the Navy.

On March 31, in Severodvinsk at the Sevmash plant, the multipurpose nuclear submarine Kazan, which was the first built according to the improved project 885M Yasen-M, was launched and launched.

On April 6, the Zvezdochka Ship Repair Center completed the repair of the Orel nuclear submarine missile cruiser (Project 949A Antey).

On April 20, at the Sredne-Nevsky shipyard in St. Petersburg, the third serial mine defense ship of project 12700 "Vladimir Emelyanov" was laid down.

On April 25, Russian President Vladimir Putin launched tests of the GTA M35R-1 gas turbine unit with the new M70FRU-2 marine engine.

On December 5, at the Leningrad shipyard "Pella", an experimental vessel "Ilmen" of project 11982 was launched.

In December it became known that the Feodosia ship-mechanical plant would be transferred to the St. Petersburg "Zvezda".

On December 25, the third frigate of project 11356 "Admiral Makarov" was transferred to the fleet.

On December 28, Zvezdochka completed the repair of the Tula nuclear submarine.

On December 29, it became known that Severnaya Verf had signed a contract for the construction of a new boathouse for the construction of large-tonnage ships and vessels.

On New Year's Eve, it became known that the transfer to the Russian Navy of the project 22350 frigate "Admiral Gorshkov", the large landing ship of project 11711 "Ivan Gren", the ship logistics support project 23120 "Elbrus" and small rocket ship of project 21631 "Vyshny Volochek".

From the editor

The legendary commander-in-chief of the Soviet Navy, Admiral of the Soviet Union Fleet S.G. Gorshkov, speaking about the balance of the Navy, argued that it "consists in the fact that all the elements that make up its combat power, and the means that provide them, are constantly in the most advantageous combination, in which the fleet can fully realize the ability to perform various tasks in conditions both nuclear and any possible war. "

For a number of years, the Central Naval Portal (TsVMP) has been conducting an independent study of the composition and condition of the fleets of the leading world powers, first of all, the Russian fleet, traditionally assessing its combat potential in relation to the US naval forces.

In its study, the CVMP accepts for calculations only those data that become available in open press: both domestic (military-industrial complex, magazine "Vlast"), and foreign (Jane "s), as well as in electronic media. The calculation of the numerical strength of both fleets was also made with certain assumptions, about which explanations were initially given in relation to support vessels, auxiliary fleet, reserve ships, methods of calculating the combat strength of the Russian Navy and the US Navy The CVMP is not an academic publication and considers possible errors acceptable.

As for the calculation of the combat capabilities of the fleets, here too, the CMCC chose not to follow the traditional methods, deliberately avoiding calculating the combat potential, especially since the term "combat potential" itself has many different definitions. We do not undertake to calculate the combat potential of the Navy and understand the complexity of taking into account the totality of various types of weapons and equipment, control and support systems, and other factors and components of such a calculation. There is a General Staff for this.

TsVMP applied its own calculation method, which allows not only to reflect in a tabular form all the diversity of the ship composition of the two fleets, but also to compare their combat capabilities.

Each row of the table is assigned its own coefficient, as in traditional methods of calculating the combat potential, weighted average coefficients are used that reflect the totality of indicators of the combat properties of ships. The choice of the value of the coefficients is not completely arbitrary, but proceeding from an assessment of the totality of the combat properties of ships of one class or another.

Nuclear submarine missile carriers, despite their exceptional firepower, have been assigned a coefficient of 0. We deliberately excluded from the calculation the "naval component of the nuclear shield" not only because "they are not supposed to participate in a non-nuclear war," the ratio of the combat capabilities of the Russian Navy and the US Navy.

Readers generally agreed on the choice of values \u200b\u200bfor other coefficients.

The obvious simplicity of the calculation yielded results that make it possible to understand the acute public concern about the state of our fleet.

According to the State Arms Program for 2011-2020 (GPV-2020), adopted at the end of 2010, more than 20 trillion rubles will be allocated for the development of the army and navy, including the construction of 50 surface ships, 8 strategic missile submarines and 20 submarines. , up to 80 ships of the auxiliary fleet.

The photo shows the US Navy Aircraft Carrier Strike Group, at the moment it is the most effective in the world, after nuclear weapons, an instrument of deterrence. Once, while still being the US Secretary of Defense, Leon Edward Panetta, said: "Any fifth grader knows that the US AUG cannot destroy any of the existing powers in the world."

Wait! But what about Russia! Personally, I was always and everywhere told that russian army can deal with the US Navy - somehow, but it can. The more advanced in this matter stated: well, with the entire fleet, maybe not, it is even possible that an aircraft carrier formation will not be overcome, but we can definitely send one AUG to the bottom. Well, very few still agreed with the Americans in their bravado.

By the way, a photo of a part of an aircraft carrier:

Let's take a look at this issue (it's interesting, after all, it's true).

I must say right away that I will not overload the post with numbers and transfers, it will be possible to get all the data and performance characteristics from different sources. I will also not elaborate indefinitely. Those. I count on some reading of visitors in this matter, the rest, if something is not clear in the names or terms, can freely glean definitions through a search engine.

Begin:

A typical US AUG is a grouping consisting of:

The flagship aircraft carrier of the group with a nuclear power plant of the "Nimitz" (or "Enterprise") type with a carrier-based aviation regiment based on it (60-80 aircraft). According to usual practice, the aircraft carrier, like the group's carrier-based aviation regiment, are separate military units of naval aviation and are under the command of naval aviation officers with the rank of captain of the first rank (U.S. Naval aviation Captain).

Air defense division of the grouping - 1-2 CD URO of the "Ticonderoga" type. The basic armament complex of the missile cruiser battalion includes the "Standart" (SM-2, SM-3) anti-aircraft missile system, and the sea-based Tomahawk missile cruiser. ). Each of the battalion's cruisers is under the command of a U.S. Navy Captain.

The PLO division of the grouping - 3-4 EM URO of the "Arleigh Burke" type with depth charges and torpedoes to combat submarines, as well as (some of the ships) with the "Tomahawk" missile launchers on board. The PLO battalion commander is a U.S. Navy Captain, while each of the division's destroyers is under the command of a U.S. Navy Commander.

Division of multipurpose submarines - 1-2 submarines of the Los Angeles type with torpedo armament and the Tomahawk missile launcher (launched through the TA boats) on board with the tasks of both the submarine grouping and strikes against coastal (surface) targets.

Supply Vessels Division - 1-2 "Saplay" type transports, ammunition transports, tankers, other auxiliary ships

OAP Naval Forces - up to 60 aircraft of the US Navy, combined into strike AE, AE AWACS, AE PLO, AE VTS, etc. The OAP of the Navy is a separate military unit of the US Navy. The OAP of the Navy, like the AVMA, is under the command of an aviation officer of the Navy in the rank of captain of the first rank or an aviation officer of the United States Marine Corps with the rank of colonel (USMC Сolonel).
For reference:

So what can we contrast with such an impressive power. Unfortunately, Russia does not have the resources to compete with the United States on an equal footing in the number of ships. In terms of aircraft carriers, the US has an overwhelming advantage, now the American has 10 aircraft carriers, we have one aircraft-carrying cruiser "Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov", which can be qualified as a light aircraft carrier, but, unfortunately, practically without aircraft. Su-33s are in service with ten of the planned twenty-five, which they already want to replace with the MiG-29K. In 2013, in addition to the existing "dryers" added two MiGs. For escort ships, the situation is also not the best.

Many will now say that there are aircraft carriers, Russia has a lot of other things to destroy the AUG. I agree that in a situation of total superiority in ships, an asymmetric response is needed. So what is he?

The Russian Armed Forces see it in missile armament, specifically in anti-ship missiles. Those. in the efficient delivery of a conventional or nuclear charge directly to the AUG ships.

First, I propose to get acquainted with the carriers of the RCC:

1. Project 1164 missile cruiser:

2. Submarine of project 949A "Antey"

3. Project 1144 heavy missile cruiser

4. Heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser of project 1143.5

Please note that the Kuznetsov deck contains all the aircraft that are available, although according to the plan it should look no less full than the American aircraft carriers, although it is smaller - compare:

There are also small missile ships, aircraft and coastal missile systems.

Since the US AUG has a serious missile defense and air defense system, and, naturally, a powerful aviation fist, the main characteristics for countering and defeating it are the detection distance and possible attack.

In order to hit the AUG composition: aircraft, ships or submarines must ensure timely detection of the aircraft carrier group, classify it, approach the missile strike distance, while maintaining combat effectiveness, and launch missiles that, having overcome air defense and electronic warfare means, must destroy ships in the composition AUG.

Consider the option of attacking the AUG by surface ships of the Russian Navy, in the oceans:

Unfortunately, the capabilities of Russian ships in the matter of detection are actually limited by the limits of the radio horizon; the helicopters on board the ships are of little use for solving this problem due to the small number of these machines and the short range. They can be effectively used only in the interests of issuing target designation of missile weapons, but before that it is still necessary to detect the enemy.

Of course, when the missile cruisers were created, i.e. under the Soviet navy, their activities were to be carried out with the support of the naval intelligence system in the ocean theater of operations. It relied on a developed system of radio-technical reconnaissance, the basis of which was ground-based centers located not only on the territory of the USSR, but also in other states. There was also an effective space naval reconnaissance, allowing to detect and track the ship formations of a potential enemy, and to issue target designation to missile weapons practically throughout the entire territory of the World Ocean. Russia does not have all this at the current time. In 2006, they began to reanimate the system, but it is still very, very far from completion.

Therefore, AUG will see our ships long before it is itself discovered. The grouping constantly provides air control to a depth of 800 km using AWACS aircraft Grumman_E-2_Hawkeye, we will be attacked by 48 aircraft, of which 25 will carry the HARPUN missile defense system, and almost 8 Boeing_EA-18_Growler units will provide electronic warfare.

Alexander MOZGOVOY

SCARY "HALBS"

The passage of "Stary Oskol" was accompanied by the accompaniment of Western media, frightening the world with the growing Russian underwater threat. However, it was so during the voyages of the first two "halibuts". Only the accents will shift somewhat. During the transition of the diesel-electric submarine "Novorossiysk" - the lead in the series - the excitement in the foreign media caused the boat to enter the Spanish port of Ceuta on the African coast to resupply and rest the crew (for more details, see the magazine "National Defense" No. 10/2015). British publications were especially zealous. They saw in the actions of Madrid a provocation directed against Gibraltar, the British enclave on the Iberian Peninsula. They say, it is outrageous that a NATO country is providing its services to the Russian warship, which is imposed by Western sanctions like a pack of wolves with red flags. And then there is such impermissible liberalism!

The campaign "Rostov-on-Don" (for more details see the magazine "National Defense" No. 1/2016) caused shock and shock in the West after this boat struck the Kalibr-PL complex with 3M-14 cruise missiles on December 8 last year a powerful blow from under the water against the targets of the terrorist organization Islamic State, banned in Russia. The United States and other NATO countries, not without reason, considered that this was not only an attack on the objects of a criminal gang, but also a warning to the North Atlantic bloc that jokes with Russia are bad, since 3M-14 missiles can be equipped with not only conventional, but also nuclear warheads. parts.

Shortly before the beginning of the transition to the Black Sea and "Stary Oskol" performed rocket firing. On May 6, the boat successfully hit an object at the Chizha training ground in the Arkhangelsk region. A day earlier, a B-262 with 3M-54 missiles struck a sea target with high accuracy.

It should be noted here that in order to save motor resources, Russian diesel-electric submarines of project 06363, after deep-sea and firing tests, make transitions from Barents Sea to Black at economic speed. Most of the way is overcome on the surface, and often in tow. So this time "Stary Oskol" was accompanied by the tug "Altai".

And suddenly a storm arose. But not at sea, but in the Western media, primarily the British. "A Royal Navy frigate intercepted a Russian submarine near the English Channel" under this headline appeared in the publication in London's The Telegraph on 8 June. This topic was amicably picked up by other publications of the United Kingdom, as well as some European and American media. The popular British Isles tabloid The Sun even called the crew of the frigate Kent "English heroes". The commander of this ship, Her Majesty, Commander Daniel Thomas, modestly noted that "the Russian submarine was discovered thanks to joint efforts with NATO allies." Indeed, as soon as the B-262 entered the North Sea, it was “escorted” by the Dutch frigate Tromp. And the "interceptor" Kent has already got the second batch. Meanwhile, UK Defense Secretary Michael Fallon said: "This means the Royal Navy remains vigilant in international and territorial waters to keep the UK safe and protect us from potential threats." In fact, Stary Oskol did not need to make its way to the English Channel to threaten the security of the United Kingdom. The boat could strike with "calibers" along the shores of Foggy Albion, while still in the Barents Sea. And the "English heroes", of course, would not have saved the country. That is, "intercepting" a Russian submarine on the approach to the English Channel in case of hostilities is a useless activity and even, we will not be afraid of this word, archaic, from somewhere in the 60s and 80s of the last century.

There was another aspect to this story. The "interception" took place shortly before Brexit - a referendum on Britain's exit or absenteeism from the European Union. As United Kingdom Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond made it clear (in Theresa May’s office, he moved to the finance minister’s chair): “Honestly, the only country that would like us to leave the EU is Russia. And that says a lot. " That is, the insidious Moscow sent the submarine in order to put pressure on the island residents. And success has been achieved! The subjects of Elizabeth II by a majority of votes said "Good bye!" European Union.

FOURTH BATTLE FOR THE ATLANTIC

But jokes aside, the picture, according to a number of Western naval experts, is bleak. In the June issue of this year, Proceedings magazine, published by the US Naval Institute, published an article by the commander of the US 6th Fleet, who is also the commander of NATO strike and Naval Support Forces in Europe, Vice Admiral James Foggo, and a leading expert of the US Naval Center. analysis by Dr. Elerik Fritz. Their publication, which caused a noticeable resonance not only in special, but also in popular media, is called very eloquently - "The Fourth Battle of the Atlantic".

What the authors mean by this is clear. The first battle means a tough confrontation between German submarines and the Entente Navy and the United States, which ended in victory for the latter. Under the second, naturally, is the most difficult struggle of the anti-submarine forces of Great Britain and the United States against the fascist submarines. In both cases, the battles for the Atlantic were accompanied by huge losses in the Allied trade tonnage. Twice England was nearly brought to its knees. Anti-submarine warfare required the concentration of large financial and material resources on both sides of the Atlantic. And only the "connection" of the United States allowed London to survive and win.

The third battle, as you might guess, refers to the years of the Cold War. The Soviet Union opposed the most powerful fleets of the USA and NATO with hundreds of nuclear and diesel-electric submarines. And although this battle did not turn into a real war, the United States and its NATO allies, according to the authors of Proceedings, gained the upper hand due to their high-class anti-submarine capabilities. The thesis is highly controversial, since such third-generation nuclear submarines as the Soviet nuclear-powered submarines of projects 941, 667BDRM, 949, 945, 671RTM and 971, as well as diesel-electric submarines of project 877 were not inferior, and in a number of characteristics were superior to their foreign counterparts. And the anti-submarine weapons of the North Atlantic Alliance cannot be called stunning. The Soviet Union lost the third battle for the Atlantic not because of the technical imperfection of Soviet submarines, but in connection with the collapse of the country that built them. Here, we believe, is not the place to dwell on the reasons for the collapse of the USSR, but we will only say that among these reasons there were excessive military spending, which led to the bankruptcy of a great power.

And now James Foggo and Eleric Fritz, along with dozens of other American and Western European naval authorities, proclaim the coming of the fourth Battle of the Atlantic. In an interview with The National Interest, which specializes in United States national security issues, the duo of Proceedings developed their ideas. They argue that "the most serious threat to the US and NATO naval forces in Europe is posed by Russia's powerful submarine fleet and its new strongholds of the access denial system (A2 / AD) in the Kaliningrad region and elsewhere."

Here, the admiral and naval expert resort to somewhat tricky American terminology, which has become popular overseas over the past three to four years. Anti-access / area-denial (A2 / AD) - literally translated as "denial of access / blocking the zone." In simple terms, this means that the armed forces of the United States and NATO cannot freely deploy their ships, aircraft and military units in certain regions of the world without the threat of being destroyed. It was first used against China, which has put into service anti-ship ballistic missiles.

DF-21D, which made the presence of American aircraft carriers off the coast of the PRC meaningless, since they are capable of hitting floating airfields at a distance of up to 2000 km. But now, according to foreign military experts, Russia has created the same access denial zones around the Kaliningrad region, off the coast of Crimea, in the Kamchatka region, around the Syrian cities of Tartus and Latakia. In our opinion, in these areas, there is still a long way to full-fledged access denial zones, but the basis for their creation, of course, is available.

Let's pay attention to the very formulation of the question. If a country takes care of its security and builds up its defense lines, then it thereby creates a threat to the United States and its NATO allies. That is, military construction throughout the world should be subordinated exclusively to the interests of Washington and its partners. And nothing else. This is not even a paradox, but paranoia.

According to Foggo, "the Russians are building a series of stealthy diesel-electric submarines that are part of the Russian denial strategy." Indeed, Project 06363 diesel-electric submarines are excellent submarines capable of performing a wide range of tasks: patrolling, conducting reconnaissance, striking coastal and sea targets, laying mines, transporting combat swimmers, etc. Obviously, they are able to "deny access" to forces hostile to Russia in certain waters adjacent to the country's shores. But, in our opinion, in this particular case, "halibuts" are drawn to the "Russian strategy of denying access" clearly by the ears, since it has nothing to do with the fourth battle for the Atlantic.

The American experts did not forget the Russian multipurpose nuclear-powered ships of the project 885 "Ash". “The nuclear submarine Severodvinsk makes a strong impression,” the commander of the 6th Fleet states with obvious regret. "The Russian submarines are of great concern to us," sings along to Admiral Elerik Fritz, "as they are very combat-ready and are an extremely maneuverable tool of the Russian Armed Forces."

A similar view is shared by British Vice Admiral Clive Johnston, who heads NATO's Naval Command. Jane's Defense Weekly, a well-known international military-technical and military-political magazine, quoted a number of his comments on this score. The admiral says that the Alliance is concerned about a record high level Russian submarine activity in the North Atlantic: “The activity of Russian submarines in the North Atlantic is currently equal or even exceeding the levels of the Cold War. Russian submarines are not only returning to Cold War level in operational activity, but they have also made a big leap in their technological characteristics and demonstrate a level of Russian potential that we have not seen before. "

PAL SHADOW

However, not all Western naval experts demonstrate such frank alarmist sentiments. There is a fairly large group of experts who do not share the views of their colleagues.

“The Russian submarine fleet, which has been in hibernation for twenty years without sea voyages and money for military service, is beginning to show signs of life again,” said Michael Kofman of the Kennan Institute at the Woodrow Wilson Center in an article posted on the CNN website. - Russia for a long time absent in underwater world, which is why most NATO countries either reduced their submarine fleet, or completely abandoned the forces and means of conducting submarine warfare. Relations with Russia were politically irritating, but in the military sphere, stable, and the Russian submarine fleet stood at the wall and in many cases rusted and died quietly at the piers. "

It is difficult to disagree with the assessment of the American expert. A similar picture was observed not only in the submarine fleet, but in the Russian Navy as a whole. The Swiss website Offiziere.ch published on December 16 last year a comparative table compiled by Louis Martin-Vizian on the ship composition of the USSR Navy in 1990 and the Russian Navy in 2015. There are minor inaccuracies in it, but they do not affect the overall picture. The table shows that over a quarter of a century the number of warships in the fleet decreased from 657 units to 172, including the number of SSBNs decreased from 59 units to 13, including the experimental Dmitry Donskoy of project 941U, nuclear submarines with cruise missiles from 58 units to 6, multipurpose nuclear-powered ships from 64 units to 17, diesel-electric submarines from 59 units to 20, cruisers (the author of the table, according to NATO practice, also includes large anti-submarine ships of projects 1134A and 1134B) from 30 units to 3, destroyers taking into account BOD projects 1155 and 11551 from 45 units to 14, frigates and corvettes (patrol ships) from 122 units to 10, large landing ships from 42 units to 19. The total number of small rocket ships, missile boats and small anti-submarine ships, which tightly and reliably held the defense of the country's shores, fell from 168 units to 68. The table does not show mine-sweeping ships, landing and artillery boats, but it is known that their number has catastrophically "collapsed". Considering that these forces have practically not been updated and are "stretched" into five maritime and ocean theaters (see the US Navy reconnaissance map), it is simply ridiculous to talk about the return of the Russian Navy to the level of the Cold War times.

“The reality is,” points out Michael Kofman, “that the Russian submarine forces today are just a pale shadow of the formidable Soviet submarine fleet, which consisted of hundreds of submarines. Despite all the talk about combat readiness, only half of the Russian submarines are currently capable of going to sea at any given time ... And, although the activity of the Russian submarine fleet has grown significantly, at least judging by the statements of the country's naval command, these numbers can impress only in comparison with the early 2000s, when submarines almost never went to sea. Claims that Russian submarine forces operate "at the level of the Cold War" are at best an exaggeration. This is simply impossible. These forces are emerging from a coma, challenging NATO in the Mediterranean and North Atlantic, but they are dwarf in size compared to the Soviet submarine fleet during the Cold War. "

Michael Kofman draws attention to the fact that the construction of Russian SSBNs and SSGNs is lagging behind schedule, "and the entire military shipbuilding program is in question due to Russian economic hardships." In an interview with The National Interest, Kofman paid more attention to the Project 885 Yasen nuclear submarine, noting that the lead submarine of this type not only took too long to build, but was also tested for a very long time: “The first submarine of the Yasen type passed sea trials for several years and only this year it entered service. "

It should be remembered here that the Severodvinsk nuclear submarine was put into trial operation on December 30, 2013, and on June 17 next year it was officially included in the Russian Navy. However, in March of this year, Vice-Admiral Alexander Fedotenkov, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy, said that this submarine had "completed trial operation." So when did this happen: in June 2014 or in March 2016? It should be noted here that in the official statement of the press service of the Northern Fleet of March 19 of this year, it was not about "trial operation", but about "the completion of the development of the lead ship of the Yasen project." It can be assumed that in June 2014 the boat was commissioned in advance, since the arrival of President Vladimir Putin to the Northern Fleet was expected, and to demonstrate to the head of state and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief an unprepared warship, about the outstanding characteristics of which so much has been said and written, the naval commanders felt like that's awkward.

Paying attention to the low rates of construction of the Yasen-class nuclear submarine, Michael Kofman says: “Each subsequent boat is, in fact, being built in an artisanal way. Who knows what characteristics the next Kazan boat will have or the one that will be built after it? Their construction takes so much time that serial production is out of the question. " One cannot but agree with this argument. When the Kazan was laid in 2009, it was said that the boat would enter service in 2014. Then the schedule was shifted to the right - until 2017. Now it has been officially announced that the fleet will receive the submarine in 2018.

And yet Michael Kofman sees a threat from Russian submarines. “Of course,” he concludes, “given the shrinking US naval forces, especially in the European theater, and NATO allies' gaps in modern forces and capabilities, even such a small submarine can create problems because it is difficult to track and contain. So the military leaders are right to express concern about today's confrontation and unstable relationship with Russia. ”

NOT UNDERSTANDING OR OVERAGING

The same approach, that is, without diminishing, but also without exaggerating the possibilities of modern russian fleet, above all underwater, and the captain of the retired US Navy, Thomas Fedyshin, also adheres. He is a professional naval sailor - served on various ships of the US Navy, including the commander of the missile destroyer William V. Pratt (DDG 44) and the missile cruiser Normandy (CG 60), was the naval attaché in Russia, and now a naval expert , Director of the Europe-Russia Research Group at the US Naval War College, which trains senior officers in the United States Navy. In an eloquent article titled "Putin's Navy Is More Than Potemkin Villages" published by Proceedings magazine in May this year, Fedyshin writes: "Western experts tend to jump to conclusions about the weakness of the Russian Navy when they argue that the Russians are only bluffing and dust in the eyes. Although much is being done for show, the Russian fleet is still dangerous. " In support of this thesis, he gives several examples. So, since 2009, the flotation of Russian sailors has noticeably increased. According to him, although the TASS news agency is probably exaggerating when it reports that 70 naval warships are constantly on alert in the World Ocean, one cannot fail to note the dramatic increase in the time spent by Russian sailors on campaigns. “Little is said about this, but there are no more conscripts on the new Russian ships and those that perform the most important tasks,” the author of the publication emphasizes. "Thus, the level of training of sailors is growing, which, of course, has a positive effect on the state of the Navy." The number of maneuvers has increased, including those joint with the navies of other states. Last year, the Russian Navy and the Chinese Navy held the largest joint exercises in their history in the Sea of \u200b\u200bJapan, as well as in the Mediterranean Sea.

Thomas Fedyshin pays special attention to the role of the Russian Navy in the Syrian crisis: “In October, unexpected launches of sea-based cruise missiles followed from the Caspian Sea and in October from the Mediterranean Sea. Russian missiles flew over 1,500 km and hit the terrorist forces. "

And this is what the author concludes: “In the end, the Russian navy has become big and strong enough for Russia to influence international affairs in the surrounding regions. And this gun is capable of shooting at a target ... After analyzing the Russian Navy from the point of view of naval strategy, ongoing operations and the state of shipbuilding in the country, we come to the conclusion that the Russian fleet has returned its status as one of the leading in the world. Its current state is better than at any time since the end of the Cold War. Judging by the classical principles of potential and intentions, the Russian Navy can be considered a threat to the interests of the West - at least in Russia's coastal waters. However, since the Russian fleet is noticeably inferior to NATO forces in the open seas and oceans, it is unlikely that it will conduct serious demonstrations of force or any offensive operations away from its home shores.

CHOICE OF WEAPON

Let's summarize some of the results of the discussion about current state of the Russian fleet. Yes, now and in the foreseeable future, the Russian Navy will not be able to compete with the naval forces of the United States, other NATO countries, as well as their partners in the Asia-Pacific region, neither in the number of ships, nor in the type of a number of classes of surface ships. To fulfill the tasks assigned to the Navy to prevent aggression against Russia from sea and ocean directions, it is necessary to determine as accurately as possible the composition of forces and means capable of reliably protecting the country, especially in the current very constrained financial circumstances. Now there is confusion and vacillation here. For example, in the media, one can often find statements by high-ranking military personnel and figures in the shipbuilding industry about preparations for the construction of nuclear-powered cruising-displacement destroyers and nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. In addition to huge costs and unmeasured terms, this will not result in anything.

For twenty years of the actual downtime of the shipbuilding industry, personnel, many key skills and technologies have been lost. Meanwhile, the fleet is in urgent need of renewal. Suffice it to say that the largest and most powerful Russian Northern Fleet of surface ships received in a quarter of a century only the heavy nuclear missile cruiser Peter the Great and the BOD Admiral Chabanenko, laid down in Soviet times and commissioned in the 90s of the last century. True, this year it is expected to receive the anti-sabotage boat "Grachonok" project 21980 with a displacement of 140 tons.

Russian industry is already capable of serial construction of minesweepers and small rocket ships. The latter proved to be highly effective in the Syrian operation. They not only carry out missile attacks on terrorists, but also guard Russian facilities from the sea on the territory of the SAR. Project 11356R / M frigates turned out to be successful and balanced. Their construction is known to be hampered by sanctions on the supply of gas turbine engines. But sooner or later this problem will be solved. It is required to bring to mind even more advanced frigates of project 22350, as well as corvettes of project 20380/20385. It is the frigates that should become the top bar in the surface naval shipbuilding of Russia. These multipurpose ships are capable of solving all the tasks facing the Russian Navy in the near and far zones.

The bet on super ships is futile. And because we have forgotten how to build them, and because they are insanely expensive, and because, despite all their super-weapons, the US Navy and NATO will be able to cope with them. You don't have to go far for examples. It was officially announced that the timing of the transfer of the Navy after the modernization of the heavy nuclear cruiser "Admiral Nakhimov" was shifted from 2018 by two years to the right. As a reminder, work on it started in the spring of 2014, but the clearing of old structures has not yet been completed. Obviously, it will not be possible to meet the re-equipment of the ship by 2020. We'll have to "steer" to the right again. In the meantime, for the same money, you can build several so necessary frigates and even more corvettes, not to mention the MRK - their account would go to dozens.

As Lenta.ru recently reported, the Russian defense industry and the Russian Navy are considering the possibility of equipping all new generation rank 1-2 warships with nuclear power plants. This trend, they say, is due to the fact that the development and production of nuclear power plants are established in Russia and do not depend on supplies from abroad. As a source told the agency, “we are talking about the creation of a line of unified installations for surface ships with a displacement of 4000 tons (frigate) to 80 and more thousand tons (aircraft carrier), with a capacity of, conditionally, from 40 to 200 megawatts. Taking into account the fact that the needs of the Navy in the next twenty years for ships of rank 1-2 can be estimated at about 40 units, the production of such a number of installations will not be particularly difficult. "

A paradoxical situation arises: they say, because we do not have reliable diesel engines and at present there are no gas turbines at all, let's equip large surface ships with nuclear power plants. Has anyone calculated the cost of this idea? Russia still has problems with the disposal of decommissioned nuclear power plants, and we are forced to seek foreign help, scaring our neighbors that without their assistance we could poison half of the planet with radioactive waste. Finally, have you thought about the fact that a warship with a nuclear power plant will surf the seas and oceans in a cheerful company of boats and ships "Greenpeace" and will not be allowed to most ports in the world? Therefore, there is no one to demonstrate the flag. With the help of nuclear monsters, you can only frighten foreign inhabitants and shake out of them money for the military spending of the United States, NATO and others like them. As a result, this will lead to the fact that the Russian Navy will not receive ships at all - neither large nor small.

The experience of the Cold War era and the present times convincingly proves that we can only "get" countries hostile to us by submarines. Therefore, the construction of multipurpose nuclear submarines should not take decades, but become strictly rhythmic. "Ash" are really excellent boats (for more details see the magazine "National Defense" №3 / 2015). They should not become obsolete on the stocks.

In March this year, it became known about the work on the fifth generation multipurpose nuclear submarine, which received the code "Husky". Its appearance is still being formed, but it is known that it will become a further development of the Project 885 nuclear submarine and will be armed with the Zircon hypersonic missiles, the tests of which have already begun. It is, of course, difficult to judge the future ship from the computer drawings of this submarine that have appeared on the Internet, especially since this "image" itself may not correspond to reality or will change over time. And yet, it can be used to form a certain idea of \u200b\u200bthe future nuclear submarine. The ideally streamlined spindle-shaped hull of the Husky strongly resembles the Project 1710 SS-530 experimental laboratory submarine, which was once created for research in the field of hydrodynamics and acoustics of promising submarines. The branded Malachite limousine form of the retractable fencing also contributes to an exceptionally "clean" silent flow. The entire nasal end is occupied by the fairing of a large-sized conformal GAS antenna. Behind it covers twenty-two vertical launchers for firing missiles and torpedoes. In this case, each launcher can accommodate several units of torpedo or rocket weapons. They can also be used to accommodate unmanned submersibles and combat swimmers' transporters. The propeller of the boat, again for noise reduction, is in a ring nozzle of the Pump Jet type. The tail rudders are cruciform. One can only guess about the Husky nuclear power plant and electronic equipment. But, undoubtedly, this nuclear submarine will be a highly automated ship - a further development of high-speed submarines of Project 705, which had the designation "Alfa" in the West.

At the end of this month, the laying of the nuclear submarine Perm is expected - the sixth submarine of the Yasen family, and in a year another one, completing the series. Then the construction of Husky boats will begin.

Submarines with nuclear installations in our country and abroad are expensive, even very expensive. Part of their tasks can be taken over by diesel-electric submarines or non-submarines. The first include the submarines of the 06363 project, six of which are intended for the Black Sea Fleet and three of which have already arrived at the place of registration - Novorossiysk. Six more such boats will be built according to a slightly modified project for the Pacific Fleet to "cool" anti-Russian passions in Japan.

And in 2018, at the Admiralty shipyards, it is planned to lay down a submarine of the Kalina type - a fifth generation non-nuclear submarine with an auxiliary air-independent (anaerobic) power plant (VNEU), which will allow the submarine not to float to the surface for several weeks. This will be a quantum leap in the development of Russia's submarine forces.

As we know, Project 06363 "halibuts" can deliver missile strikes at the enemy. But they are able to stay under water for only a few days. That is, these submarines are forced to surface to recharge their batteries and thereby unmask themselves. Even the use of an underwater engine operating device (snorkel) does not guarantee stealth. And only VNEU and high-capacity lithium-ion batteries, or even better a combination of these energy sources, enable non-nuclear submarines to be truly underwater.

If everything goes well, and we believe in it, then the Kalina-class submarines and their modifications should become the most massive ships of the Russian fleet, maybe not as numerous as the diesel-electric submarines of the 613 project (215 units) in Soviet times, but about 50-60 units can be spoken. And then the "wolf packs" of the Russian Navy, consisting of "viburnum", "halibut", "ash" and "husky", will be able to exert tight pressure on the shores of America, the European NATO states and their partners in other regions of the world. This is necessary in order to drive Arleigh Burke-class destroyers with SM-3 interceptor missiles and Tomahawk cruise missiles from the seas surrounding Russia. They will be forced to withdraw to support the United States anti-submarine defense

I recently came across an article about the naval forces of Russia and the United States, I should read it and think about why a state that always declares truth, friendship, love, compassion, DEMOCRACY and PEACE IN THE WORLD, after all, 11 aircraft carriers with a crew of 5 thousand people in everyone. I think, perhaps, that these great feelings and concepts of the social world order would be quietly and peacefully accepted by other countries of the world community.

What do you think?

US Navy - 286 warships, Russian Navy - 196.

However, comparing the fleets of the United States and the Russian Federation in terms of quantitative factors is meaningless, since on the part of the Russian Federation, the subject for comparison is whole, qualitatively absent, despite the beautiful quantitative factor.

The average age of the ships of the Russian Navy exceeds 25 years, while they were operated in conditions of total underfunding, no serious modernization was carried out, it was often not possible to carry out scheduled repairs and maintenance - the technical condition and combat capability of the Russian fleet is not difficult to imagine. For this parameter, comparison with the US Navy is impossible. Comprehensive exercises and hikes over the past two decades can be counted on the fingers of one hand. The parameter of combat training is also completely not in favor of the Russian Navy.

The raison d'être of the US Navy is the projection of power anywhere in the world. Organizational structure, the basing system and weapons - correspond to this task.

The meaning of the existence of the Russian fleet, as it is now, is unclear.

Strategic nuclear component:

In the US Navy, the strategic component is the entire fleet, incl. and surface ships and aircraft carriers, and even potentially converted into missile platforms (arsenal ships) civilian container ships, lighters and tankers capable of carrying and using hundreds of Tomahawks.

USA - up to half of the SSBNs are constantly in combat positions, the presence of the American Navy forces in all regions, the basing system, the developed aerospace forces make it possible to provide them with information and cover, and, consequently, their use, anywhere in the world.

For the Russian Navy, SSBNs are too expensive and vulnerable a launch platform as a component of nuclear deterrence forces - by itself, without a developed surface cover, it did not make sense already 10 years ago. In the current conditions, they can only shoot from the quay wall, and then if they are well covered. "Thunderstorm AUG" "Kursk" was exponentially drowned with impunity in its own waters, under the cover of the entire Northern Fleet.

Surface component:

US aircraft carriers: represented in all classes.

RF - a single aircraft carrier with a single air group, generation 4+ aircraft - in principle, is not a strike aircraft carrier, despite the letter "A" in the name of the ship's class. The reason is the air group - several units built! Yak-41M \\ Yak? 141, Su-27K, Su-25TK and MiGs of the aircraft carrier version, she is not able to attack, and they have nothing to defend - escort escorting is irrelevant - there is nowhere, there is no need, and merchant ships are mostly sawn down in 90 -x, taken to offshore, sold, went to the metal.

Cruisers URO USA: presented in all classes. A typical example is the Ticonderoga-class cruisers, with an almost frigate displacement of slightly more than 10,000 tons - only universal launchers, of which 127 can be fired from Asrok to Tomahawk, this is in addition to the Harpoon anti-ship missile complex and air defense PRO "Standard" - "Aegis". There are no analogues in the Russian Navy and are not being built.

RF - TARK and RKR - Half a dozen surviving missile cruisers of the Soviet period, built more than a quarter of a century ago, laid down more than 30 years ago, designed according to solutions, concepts and platforms half a century ago. Modern Western destroyers URO surpass them in all respects, are cheaper, in terms of maintenance incomparably cheaper, in terms of CIUS, in the class of systems, in artillery - they are orders of magnitude superior.

Anti-submarine ships - Soviet legacy, can effectively deal with submarines of past generations. The relevance is almost zero, there are no escort tasks today, and it makes no sense for foreign submarines to break through to our naval base - the launch lines of the missile launcher from enemy submarines are so far away, and are so controlled by the fleet of a potential enemy that the combat work of Russian anti-submarines to disrupt a missile strike is unlikely possible. In addition, despite a decent number, their scattering across four fleets, nowhere, except the Baltic, does not allow creating a dense anti-submarine curtain, and even there it is not relevant - who in their right mind would trample on a submarine in the Marquis puddle?

Destroyers are also an ancient Soviet legacy, their performance characteristics are lower than the existing Western counterparts built in the mid-90s, not to mention modern ones. Intelligent systems - prehistoric, the range and accuracy of artillery - a loss at times, there is no talk of a hundred universal missile containers, integration into a single combat network - you can only dream about it, the ships are almost non-automated, the crews are bloated, the maintenance is expensive.

URO frigates and corvettes are the newest corvettes of the Russian Federation - a very strong class that is not inferior to, and even surpasses its Western counterparts, for example, the project 20380 is rebalanced in firepower and is more than universal - in addition to traditional specialized weapons systems, it has the UKSK (universal shipborne firing complex ) for eight seats, which can carry up to 32 missiles of various types in various combinations, CIUS "Sigma" is built on a network principle, provides unified control of all means of the ship, and simultaneous work on air, sea, and underwater targets, several CIUS form a common network connections. It is planned to build 20 units. Here are just ordered such ships - only 5 units, for four possible spaced theaters, and one of the ships probably broke all records in terms of construction for its class - 7 years. With frigates, everything is somewhat more complicated - along with modern, truly universal and successful ships of project 22350, obsolete in all parameters are being built with incomprehensible goals, except for the presence of one complex "Club-N", frigates of project 11356 even before the descent, and the construction of ships of the project is completely inexplicable 11540. Probably, I really wanted to use the Soviet reserve.

Patrol ships - border protection, fishing, border control. While the Soviet ones are working, replacing them with modern corvettes and frigates is planned in an obviously insufficient number, see above.

A relatively strong component is missile boats, since an excellent Soviet groundwork remained for anti-ship missiles, so powerful that gray-haired designers of the retirement age, almost without generating new ideas, still effectively operate it. Hence, the same strong component is the coastal-based anti-ship missile complexes, incl. mobile.

Heavy missile-carrying platforms, ships-arsenals - are absent in the Russian Navy as a class, despite the developed and already operated UKSK. On the other hand, it makes no sense to build Russian ships of this class, since the Russian Navy is unable to organize not only cover for such ships in possible positional areas, but, in the absence of a basing system, even their transoceanic passage is questionable, for example, in an environment of isolation similar from that which took place during the transition of the II Pacific Squadron.

Naval aviation is incomparable, the United States, with the aircraft carrier aviation of the Navy, with the aircraft carrier aviation of the Marine Corps, and the coastal patrol aircraft - more than 3800 aircraft.

Coastal naval aviation of the Russian Federation is difficult to assess, the situation there is unlikely to be much better than in the Air Force.

VTA, tanker aircraft, AWACS aircraft, electronic warfare aircraft are incomparable, single copies of the Russian Federation against a well-functioning system in the United States.

The Marine Corps is now seeking, apparently, the fate of the Airborne Forces and the GRU special forces brigades will befall it. Unlike the American one, it has absolutely no corps-level organization, its own aircraft carrier aviation, a VKS component, or EFV-class facilities capable of launching tens of kilometers from the point, without putting the carrier ships at undue risk, quickly reaching the landing point, and performing fire tasks as light armored vehicles, not hundreds of thousands of trained professional personnel, nor remotely controlled combat drones such as "Crusher" or "Gladiator".

A strong component is amphibious ships, both quantitatively and qualitatively, against this background it is not clear why to buy Mistrals. On the other hand, due to the absence of AUG, their combat use is impossible, it is unrealistic to cover them during the transition, during the landing, and there is nothing to provide air cover and strikes during the operation. The feasibility of their existence in the absence of domestic aircraft carriers both in service and in construction is in doubt. Discarded money.

Based in the United States, you can write dozens, if not hundreds of dissertations on the basing system of the American Navy.

RF - the complete absence of a basing system in the oceans, the only contractual under-base in Syria - of incomprehensible meaning - the Mediterranean Sea is closed by Suez, Gibraltar, and the entrance to it is by the Bosphorus with a special regime of passage by warships.

Information support is close to zero, and foreign bases, such as Lourdes and Cam Ranh, and positions are lost. Satellite constellations - one outdated and exhausted all planned resources, and one underdeveloped - against several working ones. When was the last “survey vessel” commissioned?

Development opportunities:

If in the administrative-command totalitarian USSR, the capacities of shipbuilding plants were comparable to those of America, and the Soviet education system unsurpassed anywhere in the world made it possible to quickly train trained crews - today, in the young democratic only 20-year-old Russia (as the President said in his New Year's greetings), shipbuilding managed to degrade, skilled workers have been destroyed, domestic heavy shipbuilding is no longer a class, subcontractors have been eliminated as a category, any competent designers and rare engineers trained by the partially surviving professors of the Soviet school, at the first opportunity, are dumped to the west and to the east , and as for the training of personnel - from secondary-educated USE-testers, and highly trained lawyers-managers, mass-produced by the new community - the Russian people, it is a priori impossible to prepare calculations of warheads for complex ship systems - through understanding, the lack of education and fu National illiteracy, and training is a long, tedious, and ungrateful business - moreover, any serious modernization neutralizes the results of previous training. The main backbone of competent technical specialists directly working at combat posts - midshipman, are in the liquidation plan. A sergeant replacement is provided for them, but so far it is actually not.

The situation is very similar to the beginning of the twentieth century - when five percent of the literate population was not enough to fill positions requiring technical literacy.

The difference between the situation is that then there was growth, both industrial and scientific, and now - an increasingly accelerating degradation.

Hence, the fleet can only have one task - in peacetime - the protection of exclusively coastal economic interests, in the military - antiamphibious defense of the first line, at the cost of unambiguous own death, until the Strategic Missile Forces, ground forces and aviation swing to repel a strike - this is irrefutable, any the fleet is not able to solve other tasks, to resist the fleets of NATO, or the United States, or Europe - or even Turkey alone - it cannot, in the event of losses in a protracted conflict - today neither losses in ships, nor losses in people can be replenished, Therefore, it makes sense to build in peacetime a large number (dozens) of ships of the corvette and frigate classes, and as soon as possible to withdraw from the Navy all useless junk, adapted only to divert budget funds.

In contact with