What is a lunar shuttle. Shuttles. Space Shuttle program. Description and technical characteristics. Reusable spacecraft "Buran"
On July 21, 2011 at 09:57 UTC, the space shuttle Atlantis landed on runway 15 of the Kennedy Space Center. It was the 33rd flight of Atlantis and the 135th space expedition as part of the Space Shuttle project.
This flight was the last in the history of one of the most ambitious space programs. The project, which the United States staked on in space exploration, did not end at all the way its developers once saw it.
The idea of \u200b\u200breusable spacecraft appeared both in the USSR and in the USA at the dawn of the space age, in the 1960s. The United States moved on to its practical implementation in 1971, when North American Rockwell received an order from NASA to design and build an entire fleet of reusable ships.
According to the idea of \u200b\u200bthe authors of the program, reusable ships were to become an effective and reliable means of delivering astronauts and cargo from Earth to low-Earth orbit. The devices were supposed to scurry along the route "Earth - Space - Earth", like shuttles, which is why the program was named "Space Shuttle" - "Space Shuttle".
Initially, the "shuttles" were only part of a larger project involving the creation of a large orbital station for 50 people, a base on the moon and a small orbital station in orbit of an Earth satellite. Given the complexity of the concept, NASA was ready at the initial stage to limit itself to only a large orbital station.
When these plans were submitted to the White House for approval, uS President Richard Nixondarkened in the eyes of the number of zeros in the estimated project estimate. The United States spent a huge amount to get ahead of the USSR in the manned "lunar race", but it was impossible to continue funding space programs in a truly astronomical amount.
First start on Cosmonautics Day
After Nixon rejected these projects, NASA went for a trick. Hiding the plans to create a large orbital station aside, the president was presented with a project to create a reusable spacecraft as a system capable of generating profit and recouping investments by launching satellites into orbit on a commercial basis.
The new project was sent for examination to economists, who made a conclusion - the program will pay off if at least 30 launches of reusable ships are carried out per year, and launches of disposable ships will be stopped altogether.
NASA was convinced that these parameters are quite achievable, and the Space Shuttle project received the approval of the President and the US Congress.
Indeed, in the name of the Space Shuttle project, the United States has abandoned disposable spacecraft. Moreover, by the early 1980s, it was decided to transfer the program of launches of military and reconnaissance vehicles to "shuttles". The developers assured that their perfect miracle devices would open a new page in space exploration, make them abandon huge costs and even make a profit.
The very first reusable ship, dubbed the Enterprise by popular demand from Star Trek fans, never went into space - it only served to perfect landing techniques.
Construction of the first full-fledged reusable spacecraft began in 1975 and was completed in 1979. He received the name "Columbia" - after the name of the sailboat on which captain Robert Grayin May 1792 explored the inland waters of British Columbia.
April 12, 1981 "Columbia" with a crew of John Young and Robert Crippen successfully launched from the spaceport at Cape Canaveral. The launch was not planned to coincide with the 20th anniversary of the launch Yuri Gagarin, but fate decreed that way. The start, originally scheduled for March 17, was postponed several times due to various problems and was eventually carried out on April 12.
Start of "Columbia". Photo: wikipedia.org
Takeoff disaster
The flotilla of reusable ships in 1982 was replenished with the Challenger and Discovery, and in 1985 with the Atlantis.
The Space Shuttle project has become a pride and business card USA. Only specialists knew about its reverse side. The shuttles, for the sake of which the US manned program was interrupted for six years, were far from being as reliable as the creators had assumed. Almost every launch was accompanied by troubleshooting before launch and during the flight. In addition, it turned out that the costs of operating the shuttles are in reality several times higher than those envisaged by the project.
In NASA, critics were reassured - yes, there are drawbacks, but they are insignificant. The resource of each of the ships is designed for 100 flights, by 1990 there will be 24 launches per year, and the "shuttles" will not devour funds, but will make a profit.
On January 28, 1986, the 25th expedition under the Space Shuttle program was to start from Cape Canaveral. The Challenger spacecraft was sent into space, for which it was the 10th mission. In addition to professional astronauts, the crew included teacher Christa McAuliffe, winner of the "Teacher in Space" competition, who was supposed to give several lessons from orbit for American students.
The attention of the whole of America was riveted to this launch, relatives and friends of the Christa were present at the cosmodrome.
But on the 73rd second of the flight, in front of those present at the cosmodrome and millions of TV viewers, the Challenger exploded. Seven astronauts on board were killed.
The death of the Challenger. Photo: Commons.wikimedia.org
"Maybe" in American style
Never before in the history of astronautics has a catastrophe claimed so many lives at once. The US manned flight program was suspended for 32 months.
Investigation showed that the cause of the disaster was damage to the O-ring of the right solid propellant booster at launch. Damage to the ring caused a hole in the side of the accelerator to burn out, from which a jet stream was beating towards the external fuel tank.
In the course of clarifying all the circumstances, very unsightly details about the internal "kitchen" of NASA were revealed. In particular, NASA leaders knew about O-ring defects since 1977 - that is, since the construction of Columbia. However, they gave up on the potential threat, relying on the American "maybe". In the end, it all ended in a monstrous tragedy.
After the death of the Challenger, measures were taken and conclusions were drawn. Completion of the "shuttles" did not stop all subsequent years, and by the end of the project they were already, in fact, completely different ships.
The Endeavor was built to replace the deceased Challenger and was commissioned in 1991.
Shuttle Endeavor. Photo: Public Domain
From Hubble to ISS
It is impossible to talk only about the shortcomings of the shuttles. Thanks to them, work was carried out in space for the first time that had not been carried out before, for example, the repair of out-of-service spacecraft and even their return from orbit.
It was the "shuttle" "Discovery" that delivered the now famous Hubble telescope into orbit. Thanks to the shuttles, the telescope was repaired four times in orbit, which made it possible to extend its operation.
On the "shuttles" crews of up to 8 people were put into orbit, while the disposable Soviet "Soyuz" could lift into space and return to Earth no more than 3 people.
In the 1990s, after the project of the Soviet reusable spacecraft Buran was closed, American shuttles began to fly to the Mir orbital station. These ships played an important role in the construction of the International Space Station, delivering modules that do not have their own propulsion system into orbit. The shuttles also delivered crews, food and scientific equipment to the ISS.
Expensive and deadly
But, despite all the advantages, over the years it became obvious that the "shuttle traders" will never get rid of their shortcomings. In literally every flight, astronauts had to do repairs, fixing problems of varying severity.
By the mid-1990s, there was no talk of any 25-30 flights a year. The record year for the program was 1985 with nine flights. In 1992 and 1997, they managed to make 8 flights. NASA has long preferred to remain silent about the payback and profitability of the project.
On February 1, 2003, the Columbia spacecraft completed the 28th expedition in its history. This mission was conducted without docking with the ISS. The 16-day flight was attended by a crew of seven, including the first Israeli astronaut Ilan Ramona... During the return of "Columbia" from orbit with her lost communication. Soon, video cameras recorded in the sky the wreckage of the ship rushing to Earth. All seven astronauts on board were killed.
In the course of the investigation, it was established that at the start of the Columbia, a piece of the oxygen tank's insulation hit the left plane of the shuttle's wing. During the descent from orbit, this led to the penetration of gases with a temperature of several thousand degrees inside the ship's structures. This led to the destruction of the wing structures and further death of the ship.
Thus, the two shuttle disasters claimed the lives of 14 astronauts. Faith in the project was finally undermined.
The last crew of the Space Shuttle Columbia. Photo: Public Domain
Exhibits for the museum
The shuttle flights were interrupted for two and a half years, and after their resumption, it was decided in principle that the program would be finally completed in the coming years.
It was not only a matter of human sacrifice. The Space Shuttle project never reached the parameters that were originally planned.
By 2005, the cost of one shuttle flight was equal to $ 450 million, but with additional costs this amount reached $ 1.3 billion.
By 2006, the total cost of the Space Shuttle project was $ 160 billion.
Hardly anyone in the United States could have believed this in 1981, but the Soviet disposable Soyuz spacecraft, the modest workhorses of the Russian manned space program, won the space shuttle competition in price and reliability.
On July 21, 2011, the space odyssey of the shuttles was finally over. For 30 years, they made 135 flights, making a total of 21,152 orbits around the Earth and flying 872.7 million kilometers, lifting 355 cosmonauts and astronauts into orbit and 1.6 thousand tons of payloads.
All the shuttles took their place in the museums. The Enterprise is on display at the Maritime and Aerospace Museum in New York, Discovery is located in the Smithsonian Museum in Washington, and Endeavor has found shelter in California scientific center in Los Angeles, and the Atlantis docked permanently at the Kennedy Space Center in Florida.
The ship "Atlantis" in the center of them. Kennedy. Photo: Commons.wikimedia.org
After the termination of the shuttle flights, the United States for four years now has been unable to deliver astronauts into orbit other than with the help of the Soyuz.
American politicians, considering this state of affairs unacceptable for the United States, are calling for accelerating work on the creation of a new ship.
Hopefully, despite the rush, the lessons learned from the Space Shuttle program will be learned and a repetition of the tragedies of Challenger and Columbia will be avoided.
In any online discussion of SpaceX, a person will necessarily appear who declares that, using the example of the Shuttle, everything is already clear with your reusability. And so, after a recent wave of discussions about the successful landing of the first stage of Falcon on a barge, I decided to write a post with a brief description of the hopes and aspirations of American manned astronautics in the 60s, how these dreams then crashed into harsh reality, and why, because of all this, the Shuttle did not had no chance of becoming cost effective. Image to attract attention: Shuttle Endeavor's final flight:
Huge plans
In the first half of the sixties, after Kennedy's promise to land on the moon before the end of the decade, NASA received a monetary rain of budget funds. This, of course, caused a certain dizziness there with success. Apart from ongoing work on Apollo and on the Apollo Applications Program, work was underway on the following promising projects:
- Space stations. According to the plans, there should have been three of them: one in a low reference orbit near the Earth (LEO), one in a geostationary, one in a lunar orbit. The crew of each would be twelve people (in the future, it was planned to build even larger stations, with a crew of fifty to one hundred people), the diameter of the main module was nine meters. Each crew member was allocated a separate room with a bed, table, chair, TV, and a bunch of closets for personal belongings. There were two bathrooms (plus the commander had a private toilet in the cabin), a kitchen with an oven, dishwasher and dining tables with chairs, a separate sitting area with board games, and a first-aid post with an operating table. It was assumed that the central module of this station would be launched by the super-heavy carrier Saturn-5, and to supply it, ten flights of the hypothetical heavy carrier would be required annually. It would not be an exaggeration to say that, compared to these stations, the current ISS looks like a kennel.
Lunar base... Here's an example of a NASA project in the late sixties. As far as I understand, it was supposed to be unified with the space station modules.
Nuclear shuttle... A ship designed to move cargo from LEO to geostationary or to lunar orbit, with a nuclear rocket engine (NRM). Hydrogen would be used as a working fluid. Also, the shuttle could serve as an upper stage for a Martian ship. The project, by the way, was very interesting and would be useful in today's conditions, and as a result, we have advanced quite far with a nuclear engine. It's a pity that nothing came of it. you can read more about it.
Space tug... Designed to move cargo from a space shuttle to a nuclear shuttle, or from a nuclear shuttle to the required orbit or to the lunar surface. A great degree of uniformity was proposed in the performance of various tasks.
Space shuttle... A reusable ship designed to lift cargo from the surface of the Earth to LEO. In the illustration, a space tug is carrying cargo from it to a nuclear shuttle. Actually, this is what mutated over time in the Space Shuttle.
Martian spaceship... Shown here with two nuclear shuttles serving as boosters. It was intended for a flight to Mars in the early eighties, with the expedition staying for two months on the surface.
If anyone is interested, and more details are written about all this, with illustrations (eng.)
Space shuttle
As you can see above, the space shuttle was just one part of the planned cyclopean space infrastructure. In combination with a space-based nuclear shuttle and tug, it was supposed to ensure the delivery of cargo from the earth's surface to any point in space, up to the lunar orbit.
Before that, all space rockets (ILVs) were disposable. Spacecraft were also disposable, with the rarest exception in the field of manned spacecraft - the Mercury with serial numbers 2, 8, 14 and also the second Gemini flew twice. Due to the gigantic planned volumes of launching the payload (PN) into orbit, the NASA leadership formulated the task: to create a reusable system, when both the launch vehicle and the spacecraft return after flight and are used repeatedly. Such a system would cost much more in development than conventional ILVs, but due to lower operating costs, it would quickly pay off at the level of the planned cargo traffic.
The idea of \u200b\u200bcreating a reusable rocket plane seized the minds of most - in the mid-sixties there were many reasons to think that creating such a system was not too difficult a task. The Dyna-Soar space rocket project may have been canceled by McNamara in 1963, but this happened not because the program was technically impossible, but simply because there were no tasks for the spacecraft - Mercury and the Gemini created then coped with the delivery of astronauts to a near-earth orbit, and the X-20 could not launch a significant PN or stay in orbit for a long time. But the experimental X-15 rocket plane proved to be excellent during operation. In the course of 199 flights, it worked out going beyond the Karman line (i.e. beyond the conditional boundary of space), hypersonic entry back into the atmosphere and control in vacuum and zero gravity.
Naturally, the proposed space shuttle would require a much more powerful reusable engine and better thermal protection, but these problems did not seem insurmountable. The RL-10 liquid-propellant rocket engine (LRE) by that time had shown excellent reusability at the stand: in one of the tests, this liquid-propellant rocket engine was successfully launched more than fifty times in a row, and worked for a total of two and a half hours. The proposed Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME), as well as the RL-10, was supposed to create oxygen-hydrogen on fuel steam, but at the same time increase its efficiency by increasing the pressure in the combustion chamber and introducing a closed cycle scheme with afterburning the fuel generator gas.
No special problems were expected with thermal protection. First, work was already underway on a new type of thermal protection based on silicon dioxide fibers (it was from this that the tiles of the Shuttle and Buran created later). Ablation panels remained as a backup option, which could be changed after each flight for relatively little money. And secondly, in order to reduce the heat load, it was supposed to make the entry of the apparatus into the atmosphere according to the principle of a "blunt body" - ie. using the form aircraft create a front of a shock wave, which would cover a large area of \u200b\u200bheated gas. Thus, the kinetic energy of the spacecraft intensively heats the surrounding air, reducing the heating of the aircraft.
In the second half of the sixties, several aerospace corporations presented their vision of the future rocket plane.
Lockheed's Star Clipper was a spaceplane with a supporting body - fortunately, by that time, aircraft with a supporting body were already well developed: ASSET, HL-10, PRIME, M2-F1 / M2-F2, X-24A / X-24B (by the way, the Dreamchaser currently being created is also a spaceplane with a load-bearing body). True, the Star Clipper was not fully reusable; fuel tanks with a diameter of four meters along the edges of the aircraft were dropped during takeoff.
The McDonnell Douglas project also had drop tanks and a carrying hull. The highlight of the project was the wings extended from the hull, which were supposed to improve the takeoff and landing characteristics of the spaceplane:
General Dynamics put forward the concept of the "triam twin". The spacecraft in the middle was a spaceplane, two spacecraft on the sides served as the first stage. It was planned that the unification of the first stage and the ship would help save money during development.
The rocket plane itself was supposed to be reusable, but there was no certainty about the booster for quite some time. Within the framework of this, a lot of concepts were considered, some of which were balancing on the brink of noble madness. Just like you, for example, this concept of a reusable first stage, with a launch mass of 24 thousand tons (on the left, Atlas ICBMs, for scale). For the launch ambassador, the stage was supposed to flop into the ocean and be towed to the port.
However, three possible options were most seriously considered: a cheap disposable rocket stage (i.e. Saturn-1), a reusable first stage with an LPRE, and a reusable first stage with a hypersonic ramjet engine. Illustration from 1966:
Around the same time, research began at the Manned Spacecraft Center's technical directorate under the direction of Max Fage. He, in my personal opinion, was the most elegant project created as part of the development of the Space Shuttle. Both the carrier and the space shuttle ship were conceived to be winged and manned. It is worth noting that Faget abandoned the carrier body, reasoning that it would significantly complicate the development process - changes in the shuttle layout could greatly affect its aerodynamics. The carrier aircraft took off vertically, worked as the first stage of the system, and after the separation of the ship landed at the airfield. When leaving orbit, the spaceplane was supposed to slow down, like the X-15, by entering the atmosphere with a significant angle of attack, thereby creating an extensive shock wave front. After entering the atmosphere, the Fazet shuttle could glide about 300-400 km (the so-called horizontal maneuver, "cross-range") and land at a quite comfortable landing speed of 150 knots.
Clouds are gathering over NASA
Here it is necessary to make a short digression about America in the second half of the sixties, so that the further development of events becomes clearer for the reader. There was an extremely unpopular and costly war in Vietnam, in 1968 almost seventeen thousand Americans died there - more than the losses of the USSR in Afghanistan during the entire conflict. The civil rights movement for blacks in the United States in the same 1968 culminated in the assassination of Martin Luther King and the wave of riots that followed in major American cities. Large-scale government social programs became immensely popular (Medicare was adopted in 1965), President Johnson declared a "war on poverty" and spending on infrastructure - all of which required significant government spending. In the late sixties, a recession began.
At the same time, the fear of the USSR was significantly dulled, the world nuclear missile war no longer seemed as inevitable as in the fifties and during the Caribbean crisis. The Apollo program fulfilled its purpose, winning the space race with the USSR in the American public consciousness. Moreover, this gain for most Americans was inevitably associated with a sea of \u200b\u200bmoney that was literally flooded with NASA to accomplish this task. In a 1969 Harris poll, 56% of Americans thought the cost of the Apollo program was too high, and 64% thought that $ 4 billion a year for NASA development was too much.
And at NASA, it seems that many of this simply did not understand. The new director of NASA Thomas Payne, who was not too experienced in political affairs, did not understand this for sure (or maybe he just did not want to understand). In 1969, he put forward a plan of action for NASA for the next 15 years. A lunar orbital station (1978) and a lunar base (1980), manned by an expedition to Mars (1983) and an orbital station for one hundred people (1985) were envisaged. The middle (i.e. baseline) scenario assumed that NASA funding would have to be increased from the current 3.7 billion in 1970 to 7.65 billion by the early eighties:
All this caused an acute allergic reaction in Congress and, accordingly, in the White House too. As one of the congressmen wrote, in those years nothing was cut as easily and naturally as astronautics, if you said at a meeting "this space program must be stopped" - you are guaranteed popularity. Within a relatively short period of time, almost all large-scale NASA projects were formally canceled one by one. Of course, the manned expedition to Mars and the base on the Moon were canceled, even the flights of Apollo 18 and 19 were canceled. ILV Saturn V was slaughtered. All giant space stations were canceled, leaving only a stump of Apollo Applications in the form of Skylab - however, the second Skylab was also canceled there. They froze and then canceled the nuclear shuttle and the space tug. Even the innocent Voyager (the predecessor of the Viking) fell under the hot hand. The space shuttle almost came under the knife, and miraculously survived in the House of Representatives by a single vote. This is what NASA's budget looked like in reality (constant 2007 dollars):
If you look at the funds allocated to it as a% of federal budget, then it's still sadder:
Almost all of NASA's plans for the development of manned astronautics ended up in the trash can, and the barely surviving Shuttle from not the largest element of the once grandiose program turned into the flagship of American manned astronautics. NASA was still afraid of canceling the program, and to justify it, it began to convince everyone that the Shuttle would be cheaper than the then existing heavy carriers, and without the frenzied cargo flow that should have been generated by the deceased space infrastructure. NASA could not afford to lose the shuttle - the organization was actually created by manned astronautics, and wanted to continue sending people into space.
Alliance with the Air Force
The hostility from Congress deeply impressed NASA officials and prompted them to seek allies. I had to bow to the Pentagon, or rather to the US Air Force. Fortunately, NASA and the Air Force have cooperated quite well since the early sixties, in particular on the XB-70 and the above-mentioned X-15. NASA even went for the cancellation of its Saturn I-B (bottom right) so as not to create unnecessary competition with the heavy ILV Titan III (bottom left):
The Air Force generals were very interested in the idea of \u200b\u200ba cheap launch vehicle, and they also wanted to be able to send people into space - at about the same time, the military space station Manned Orbiting Laboratory, an approximate analogue of the Soviet "Almaz", was finally cut down. They also liked the declared possibility of returning cargo on the Shuttle; they even considered options for stealing Soviet spacecraft.
However, in general, the Air Force was much less interested in this alliance than NASA, because they had their own spent carrier. Because of this, they were able to easily bend the Shuttle design to their requirements, which they immediately took advantage of. At the insistence of the military, the size of the cargo compartment for the payload was increased from 12 x 3.5 meters to 18.2 x 4.5 meters (length x diameter), so that promising spy satellites for optical-electronic reconnaissance (specifically - KH-9 Hexagon and, possibly , KH-11 Kennan). The shuttle's payload had to be increased to 30 tons when flying into low-earth orbit, and up to 18 tons into polar orbit.
The Air Force also demanded a horizontal shuttle maneuver of at least 1,800 kilometers. The point was this: during the Six Day War, American intelligence received satellite photographs after fighting They rode, because the reconnaissance satellites Gambit and Korona used then did not have time to return the filmed film to Earth. It was assumed that the Shuttle will be able to launch from Vandenberg on the west coast of the United States into polar orbit, shoot what is needed, and immediately land after one orbit - thereby ensuring high efficiency in obtaining intelligence. The required lateral maneuver distance was determined by the Earth's displacement during the orbit, and was exactly the 1800 kilometers mentioned above. To fulfill this requirement, it was necessary, firstly, to put on the Shuttle a delta wing more suitable for planning, and secondly, to greatly strengthen the thermal protection. The graph below shows the estimated heating rate of a space shuttle with a straight wing (Faget concept), and with a delta wing (i.e. what turned out to be on the Shuttle as a result):
The irony here is that soon the spy satellites began to be equipped with CCDs capable of transmitting images directly from orbit, without having to return the film. The need for landing after one orbit disappeared, although later this possibility was still justified by the possibility of a quick emergency landing. But the delta wing and the associated thermal protection problems remained with the Shuttle.
However, the deed was done, and the support of the Air Force in Congress made it possible to partially secure the future of the Shuttle. NASA finally approved as a project a two-stage fully reusable Shuttle with 12 (!) SSMEs in the first stage and sent out contracts to study its layout.
North American Rockwell Project:
McDonnell Douglas Project:
Grumman project. An interesting detail: despite NASA's requirement for full reusability, the shuttle nevertheless was supposed to have disposable hydrogen tanks on the sides:
Business case
I mentioned above that after Congress gutted NASA's space program, they had to start justifying the creation of the shuttle from an economic point of view. And so, in the early seventies, officials from the Management and Budget Office ( The office of Management and Budget, OMB) asked them to prove the declared economic efficiency of the Shuttle. Moreover, it was not necessary to demonstrate that launching a shuttle would be cheaper than launching a disposable carrier (this was taken for granted); No, it was necessary to compare the allocation of funds required for the creation of the Shuttle with the continued use of existing disposable media and the investment of the freed up money at 10% per annum - i.e. in fact, OMB gave the Shuttle a "junk" rating. This made any economic feasibility study for the shuttle as a commercial launch vehicle unrealistic, especially after being “inflated” by the demands of the Air Force. And yet NASA tried to do it, because, again, the existence of the American manned program was at stake.
A feasibility study was commissioned from Mathematica. The often mentioned figure of the cost of launching the Shuttle in the region of $ 1-2.5 million is only promises by Mueller at a conference in 1969, when its final configuration was not yet clear, and before changes caused by the requirements of the Air Force. For the projects above, the cost of the flight was as follows: $ 4.6 million 1970 model. for the North American Rockwell and McDonnell Douglas shuttles, and $ 4.2 million for the Grumman shuttle. At the very least, the authors of the report were able to pull the owl onto the globe, showing that by the mid-eighties the Shuttle was supposedly looking more attractive from a financial point of view than the existing carriers, even taking into account 10% of the OMB requirements:
However, the devil is in the details. As I mentioned above, there was no way to demonstrate that the Shuttle, with an estimated $ 12 billion development and manufacturing cost, would be cheaper than disposable media when accounting for a 10% OMB discount. So the analysis had to make the assumption that the lower cost of the launch would allow satellite manufacturers to spend significantly less time and money on research and development (R&D) and satellite manufacturing. It was declared that they would prefer to take advantage of the possibility of cheap launching of satellites into orbit and repair thereof. Further, a very large number of launches per year was assumed: the baseline scenario shown in the graph above postulated 56 Shuttle launches every year from 1978 to 1990 (736 in total). Moreover, even the option with 900 flights during the specified period was considered as a limiting scenario, i.e. start every five days for thirteen years!
Cost of three different programs in the baseline scenario - two one-off rockets and a Shuttle, 56 launches per year (million dollars):
| Existing ILV | Promising ILV | Space shuttle | |
| ILV costs | |||
| R&D | 960 | 1 185 | 9 920 |
| Launch facilities, shuttle manufacturing | 584 | 727 | 2 884 |
| Total cost of launches | 13 115 | 12 981 | 5 510 |
| Total | 14 659 | 14 893 | 18 314 |
| PN expenses | |||
| R&D | 12 382 | 11 179 | 10 070 |
| Production and fixed costs | 31 254 | 28 896 | 15 786 |
| Total | 43 636 | 40 075 | 25 856 |
| ILV and PN expenses | 58 295 | 54 968 | 44 170 |
Of course, OMB representatives were not satisfied with this analysis. They quite rightly pointed out that even if the cost of the Shuttle flight is indeed the same (4.6 million / flight), there is still no reason to believe that satellite manufacturers will compromise on reliability in favor of production costs. On the contrary, the existing tendencies indicated the forthcoming significant increase in the average life of a satellite in orbit (which ultimately happened). Further, the officials justly pointed out that the number of space launches in the baseline scenario was extrapolated from the level of 1965-1969, when a large share of them were provided by NASA, with its then gigantic budget, and the Air Force, with their then short-lived optical reconnaissance satellites. Before all of NASA's bold plans were cut, it was still possible to assume that the number of launches would increase, but without NASA's expenses, it would certainly begin to fall (which also turned out to be true). Also, the increase in costs accompanying all state programs was completely ignored: for example, the increase in the costs of the Apollo program in the period from 1963 to 1969 was 75%. OMB's final verdict was that the alleged fully reusable two-stage Stuttle is not economically viable compared to the Titan-III when the 10% rate is taken into account.
I apologize for writing so much about financial details that may not be of interest to everyone. But this is all extremely important in the context of the discussion of the Space Shuttle's reusability - especially since the figures mentioned above and, frankly, sucked from a finger can still be seen in discussions about the reusability of space systems. In fact, without taking into account the "PN effect" even according to the figures accepted by Mathematica and without any 10% discounts, the Shuttle became more profitable than Titan only starting from ~ 1100 flights (real shuttles flew 135 times). But do not forget - we are talking about the "inflated" Air Force requirements Shuttle with a delta wing and complex thermal protection.
The shuttle becomes semi-reusable
Nixon didn’t want to be the president who would cover the entire American manned program. But he also did not want to ask Congress to allocate a lot of money for the creation of the Shuttle, especially after the conclusion of officials from the OMB, the congressmen would not agree to this anyway. For the development and production of Shuttles, it was decided to allocate about five and a half billion dollars (i.e., more than two times less than what was needed for a fully reusable Shuttle), with the requirement to spend no more than a billion in any given year.
In order to be able to create a Shuttle within the allocated funds, it was to make the system partially reusable. First, the concept of Grumman was creatively rethought: they managed to reduce the size of the shuttle by placing both fuel vapors in an external tank, at the same time, the required size of the first stage was also reduced. The diagram below shows the size of a fully reusable spaceplane, a spaceplane with an external hydrogen tank (LH2), and a spaceplane with an external tank for both oxygen and hydrogen (LO2 / LH2).
But the development cost was still much higher than the amount allocated from the budget. As a result, NASA also had to abandon the reusable first stage. It was decided to attach a simple booster to the aforementioned tank, either in parallel or at the bottom of the tank:
After a short discussion, the placement of the boosters in parallel with the external tank was approved. Two main options were considered as boosters: solid-propellant (TTU) and liquid-propellant boosters, the latter either with a turbocharger or with a displacement supply of components. It was decided to stop at TTU, again due to the lower development cost. Sometimes you can hear that there was supposedly a certain mandatory requirement to use the TTU, which - where everything ruined - but, as we can see, replacing the TTU with boosters with liquid-propellant engines could not fix anything. Moreover, boosters on liquid-propellant rocket engines flopping into the ocean, albeit with a displacement supply of components, would in fact have even more problems than with solid-fuel boosters.
The result was the Space Shuttle that we know today:
Well, a short history of its evolution (clickable):
Epilogue
The shuttle was not as unfortunate a system as it is customary to exhibit today. In the eighties, the Shuttle put 40% of the entire mass of the spacecraft delivered in that decade into low-Earth orbit, despite the fact that its launches were only 4% of total launches of ILV. He also brought into space the lion's share of the people who have been there to date (another thing is that the very need for the presence of people in orbit is still unclear):
In 2010 prices, the cost of the program was 209 billion, if divided by the number of launches, it will be released somewhere around 1.5 billion per launch. True, the bulk of the costs (design, modernization, etc.) does not depend on the number of launches - therefore, according to NASA estimates, by the end of the 2000s, the cost of each flight was about $ 450 million. However, this is the price tag already under the completion of the program, and even after the disasters of Challenger and Columbia, which led to additional safety measures and an increase in the cost of launch. In theory, in the mid-80s, before the Challenger disaster, the launch cost was much less, but I have no specific figures. Unless I will point out the fact that the Titan IV Centaur's launch cost in the first half of the nineties was 325 million of those dollars, which is even slightly higher than the above mentioned cost of launching the Shuttle in 2010 prices. But it was the heavy launch vehicles from the Titan family that were the Shuttle's competitor during its creation.
Of course, the Shuttle was not commercially cost effective. By the way, the economic inexpediency of this very worried the leadership of the USSR at one time. They did not understand the political reasons that led to the creation of the Shuttle, and invented various purposes for it in order to somehow link its existence in their heads with their views on reality - the famous "dive to Moscow", or basing weapons in space. As the director of the head in the rocket and space industry of the Central Scientific Research Institute of Mechanical Engineering Yu.A. Mozzhorin recalled in 1994: " The shuttle put 29.5 tons into a near-earth orbit, and could lower a load of up to 14.5 tons from orbit. This is very serious, and we began to study for what purpose it is being created? After all, everything was very unusual: the weight put into orbit with the help of disposable carriers in America did not even reach 150 t / year, but here it was thought to be 12 times more; nothing went down from orbit, but here it was supposed to return 820 t / year ... It was not just a program to create some kind of space system under the motto of reducing the cost of transport costs (our, our research institute showed that no reduction in fact would be observed ), it had a clear military purpose. And indeed, at this time they began to talk about the creation of powerful lasers, beam weapons, weapons based on new physical principles, which - theoretically - can destroy enemy missiles at a distance of several thousand kilometers. It was precisely the creation of such a system that was supposed to test this new weapon in space conditions.". The fact that the Shuttle was made taking into account the requirements of the Air Force played a role in this mistake, but the USSR did not understand the reasons why the Air Force was involved in the project. They thought that the project was originally initiated by the military, and is being done for military purposes. NASA desperately needed the Shuttle to stay afloat, and if the Air Force's support in Congress depended on the Air Force demanding to paint the Shuttle green and decorate it with garlands, they would do it. SDI, but when it was designed in the seventies, there was no talk of anything like that.
I hope now the reader understands that to judge the reusability of space systems on the example of the Shuttle is an extremely unfortunate idea. Cargo flows for the shuttle never materialized due to NASA's cutbacks. The Shuttle's design had to be seriously redesigned twice - first due to demands from the Air Force, for which NASA needed political support, and then due to criticism of the OMB and insufficient funding for the program. All the economic rationales, to which you sometimes come across in discussions of reusability, appeared at a time when NASA needed to save the shuttle, which had already mutated so much due to the demands of the Air Force, at any cost, and are simply far-fetched. Moreover, all the participants in the program understood this - Congress, the White House, the Air Force, and NASA. For example, the Michoud Assembly Facility could produce at most twenty-something external fuel tanks per year, that is, no fifty-six or even thirty-something flights per year, as in the Mathematica report, was out of the question.
I took almost all the information from a wonderful book, which I recommend for reading to all those interested in the issue. Also, some passages of the text were borrowed from the posts of uv. Tico in this topic.
"Shuttle" and "Buran"
When you look at photographs of the Burana and Shuttle winged spacecraft, you might get the impression that they are quite identical. At least there shouldn't be any fundamental differences. Despite the external similarity, these two space systems are still fundamentally different.
"Shuttle"
The Shuttle is a reusable transport spacecraft (MTKK). The ship has three liquid-propellant rocket engines (LPRE), running on hydrogen. Oxidizing agent - liquid oxygen. To make an entry into low-earth orbit, a huge amount of fuel and oxidizer is required. Therefore, the fuel tank is the largest element of the Space Shuttle system. The spacecraft is located on this huge tank and is connected to it by a system of pipelines through which fuel and oxidizer are supplied to the Shuttle's engines.
And all the same, the three powerful engines of the winged ship are not enough to go into space. Attached to the central tank of the system are two solid-propellant boosters - the most powerful missiles in human history today. The greatest power is needed precisely at the start to move the multi-ton ship and lift it to the first four and a half tens of kilometers. Solid rocket boosters take on 83% of the load.
Another "Shuttle" takes off
At an altitude of 45 km, solid-fuel boosters, having used up all the fuel, are separated from the ship and are splashed down in the ocean by parachutes. Further, to an altitude of 113 km, the "shuttle" rises with the help of three rocket engines. After separating the tank, the ship flies for another 90 seconds by inertia and then, for a short time, two orbital maneuvering engines powered by self-igniting fuel are turned on. And the "shuttle" goes into working orbit. And the tank enters the atmosphere, where it burns. Parts of it fall into the ocean.
Department of solid fuel accelerators
Orbital maneuvering engines are intended, as their name implies, for various maneuvers in space: to change orbital parameters, to dock to the ISS or to other spacecraft in low-Earth orbit. So "shuttles" several times visited the Hubble orbiting telescope for service.
Finally, these thrusters serve to create a braking impulse when returning to Earth.
The orbital stage is made according to the aerodynamic configuration of a tailless monoplane with a low-lying delta wing with a double swept leading edge and a vertical tail of the usual scheme. For atmospheric control, a two-piece rudder on the keel (here is an air brake), elevons on the trailing edge of the wing and a balancing flap under the aft fuselage are used. Retractable chassis, tricycle, with nose wheel.
Length 37.24 m, wingspan 23.79 m, height 17.27 m. "Dry" weight of the vehicle is about 68 tons, takeoff weight - from 85 to 114 tons (depending on the task and payload), landing with a return load on board - 84.26 tons.
The most important design feature of the airframe is its thermal protection.
In the most heat-stressed places (design temperature up to 1430 ° C), a multilayer carbon-carbon composite is used. There are not many such places, it is mainly the fuselage nose and the leading edge of the wing. The lower surface of the entire apparatus (heating from 650 to 1260 ° C) is covered with tiles made of a material based on quartz fiber. The top and side surfaces are partially protected by low-temperature insulation tiles - where the temperature is 315-650 ° C; in other places where the temperature does not exceed 370 ° C, felt material covered with silicone rubber is used.
The total weight of all four types of thermal protection is 7164 kg.
The orbital stage has a double-deck cabin for seven astronauts.
Shuttle upper deck
In the case of an extended flight program or when performing rescue operations, up to ten people can be on board the shuttle. In the cockpit, there are flight controls, work and sleeping places, a kitchen, a storeroom, a sanitary compartment, an airlock, operations and payload control posts, and other equipment. The total pressurized volume of the cabin is 75 cubic meters. m, the life support system maintains a pressure of 760 mm Hg in it. Art. and a temperature in the range of 18.3 - 26.6 ° C.
This system is made in an open version, that is, without the use of air and water regeneration. This choice is due to the fact that the duration of the shuttle flights was set at seven days, with the possibility of bringing it up to 30 days using additional funds. With such insignificant autonomy, the installation of regeneration equipment would mean an unjustified increase in weight, power consumption and complexity of onboard equipment.
The supply of compressed gases is enough to restore the normal atmosphere in the cabin in the event of one complete depressurization or to maintain a pressure of 42.5 mm Hg in it. Art. within 165 minutes when a small hole is formed in the hull shortly after the start.
The cargo compartment measures 18.3 x 4.6 m and a volume of 339.8 cubic meters. m is equipped with a "three-knee" manipulator 15.3 m long. When the compartment doors are opened, the radiators of the cooling system turn into the working position together with them. The reflectivity of the radiator panels is such that they remain cold even when the sun is shining on them.
What the Space Shuttle can do and how it flies
If we imagine an assembled system flying horizontally, we see an external fuel tank as its central element; an orbiter is docked to it from above, and accelerators are on the sides. The total length of the system is 56.1 m, and the height is 23.34 m. The overall width is determined by the wingspan of the orbital stage, that is, it is 23.79 m. The maximum launch weight is about 2,041,000 kg.
It is impossible to speak so unambiguously about the size of the payload, since it depends on the parameters of the target orbit and on the launch point of the spacecraft. Here are three options. The Space Shuttle system is capable of displaying:
- 29,500 kg when launched eastward from Cape Canaveral (Florida, east coast) into an orbit with an altitude of 185 km and an inclination of 28º;
- 11 300 kg when launched from the Space Flight Center. Kennedy into an orbit with an altitude of 500 km and an inclination of 55º;
- 14,500 kg when launched from the Vandenberg Air Force Base (California, west coast) into a circumpolar orbit with an altitude of 185 km.
There were two landing strips for the shuttles. If the shuttle landed far from the cosmodrome, it would return home on a Boeing 747
Boeing 747 takes shuttle to the cosmodrome
A total of five shuttles were built (two of them died in accidents) and one prototype.
When developing, it was envisaged that the shuttles would make 24 launches a year, and each of them would make up to 100 flights into space. In practice, they were used much less - by the end of the program in the summer of 2011, 135 launches were made, of which Discovery - 39, Atlantis - 33, Columbia - 28, Endeavor - 25, Challenger - 10 ...
The shuttle's crew consists of two astronauts - the commander and the pilot. The shuttle's largest crew is eight astronauts (Challenger, 1985).
Soviet reaction to the creation of the Shuttle
The development of the "shuttle" made a great impression on the leaders of the USSR. It was considered that the Americans were developing an orbital bomber armed with space-to-ground missiles. The huge size of the shuttle and its ability to return cargo up to 14.5 tons to Earth were interpreted as a clear threat of the abduction of Soviet satellites and even Soviet military space stations such as Almaz, which flew in space under the name Salyut. These estimates were erroneous, since the United States abandoned the idea of \u200b\u200ba space bomber back in 1962 due to the successful development of a nuclear submarine fleet and ground-based ballistic missiles.
Soyuz could easily fit in the shuttle's cargo hold
Soviet experts could not understand why 60 shuttle launches were needed per year - one launch per week! Where did the set of space satellites and stations for which the Shuttle would need come from? Soviet people living in a different economic system could not even imagine that the leadership of NASA, which was strenuously pushing a new space program in the government and Congress, was driven by the fear of being unemployed. The lunar program was nearing completion and thousands of highly qualified specialists were out of work. And, most importantly, the respected and very well-paid NASA executives faced a disappointing prospect of parting with their inhabited offices.
Therefore, an economic feasibility study was prepared on the great financial benefit of reusable transport spacecraft in case of abandonment of disposable rockets. But for the Soviet people it was absolutely incomprehensible that the president and the congress could spend national funds only with a great regard for the opinion of their voters. In this connection, the opinion prevailed in the USSR that the Americans were creating a new QC for some future incomprehensible tasks, most likely military ones.
Reusable spacecraft "Buran"
In the Soviet Union, it was originally planned to create an improved copy of the Shuttle - an OS-120 orbital aircraft, weighing 120 tons (the American shuttle weighed 110 tons at full load). Unlike the Shuttle, it was planned to equip the Buran with an ejection cockpit for two pilots and turbojet engines for landing at the airport.
The leadership of the armed forces of the USSR insisted on almost complete copying of the "shuttle". By this time, Soviet intelligence was able to obtain a lot of information on the American spacecraft. But it turned out to be not so simple. Domestic hydrogen-oxygen rocket engines turned out to be large in size and heavier than American ones. In addition, they were inferior in capacity to overseas ones. Therefore, instead of three rocket engines, it was necessary to install four. But on the orbital plane there was simply no room for four propulsion engines.
At the "shuttle" 83% of the load at the start was carried by two solid-propellant boosters. It was not possible to develop such powerful solid-propellant missiles in the Soviet Union. Missiles of this type were used as ballistic carriers of sea and land-based nuclear charges. But they did not reach the required power very, very much. Therefore, the Soviet designers had the only opportunity - to use liquid-propellant rockets as accelerators. Under the Energia-Buran program, very successful kerosene-oxygen RD-170s were created, which served as an alternative to solid-fuel boosters.
The very location of the Baikonur cosmodrome forced the designers to increase the power of their launch vehicles. It is known that the closer the launch pad is to the equator, the greater the load one and the same rocket can put into orbit. The American cosmodrome at Cape Canaveral has a 15% advantage over Baikonur! That is, if a rocket launched from Baikonur can lift 100 tons, then when launched from Cape Canaveral, it will put 115 tons into orbit!
Geographical conditions, differences in technology, characteristics of the created engines and a different design approach - all influenced the appearance of the Buran. Based on all these realities, a new concept and a new orbital spacecraft OK-92, weighing 92 tons, were developed. Four oxygen-hydrogen engines were transferred to the central fuel tank and the second stage of the Energia launch vehicle was obtained. Instead of two solid-propellant boosters, it was decided to use four missiles on liquid fuel kerosene-oxygen with four-chamber RD-170 engines. Four-chamber means four nozzles; a nozzle with a large diameter is extremely difficult to manufacture. Therefore, the designers go to the complication and weighting of the engine by designing it with several smaller nozzles. There are as many nozzles as there are combustion chambers with a bunch of fuel and oxidizer supply pipelines and with all the "moorings". This link was made according to the traditional, "royal" scheme, similar to the "alliances" and "east", became the first stage of "Energy".
"Buran" in flight
The Buran cruise ship itself became the third stage of the launch vehicle, similar to the Soyuz. The only difference is that the Buran was located on the side of the second stage, while the Soyuz was at the very top of the launch vehicle. Thus, the classic scheme of a three-stage disposable space system was obtained, with the only difference that the orbiter was reusable.
Reusability was another problem of the Energia-Buran system. The Americans' shuttles were designed for 100 flights. For example, orbital maneuvering engines could withstand up to 1000 turns. All elements (except the fuel tank) after preventive maintenance were suitable for launching into space.
Solid fuel booster picked up by a special vessel
Solid propellant boosters were parachuted into the ocean, picked up by special NASA vessels and delivered to the manufacturer's plant, where they underwent preventive maintenance and were filled with fuel. The Shuttle itself was also thoroughly checked, prevented and repaired.
Defense Minister Ustinov, in an ultimatum, demanded that the Energia-Buran system be maximally recyclable. Therefore, the designers were forced to tackle this problem. Formally, the side boosters were considered reusable, suitable for ten launches. But in fact, it did not come to this for many reasons. Take at least the fact that American accelerators flopped into the ocean, and Soviet ones fell in the Kazakh steppe, where landing conditions were not as benign as the warm ocean waters. And a liquid rocket is a more delicate creation. than solid fuel. "Buran" was also designed for 10 flights.
In general, the reusable system did not work, although the achievements were obvious. The Soviet orbiter, freed from the large propulsion engines, received more powerful engines for maneuvering in orbit. Which, in the case of its use as a space "fighter-bomber", gave it great advantages. Plus turbojets for atmospheric flight and landing. In addition, a powerful rocket was created with the first stage on kerosene fuel, and the second on hydrogen. It was precisely such a rocket that the USSR lacked to win the lunar race. In terms of its characteristics, Energia was practically equal to the American Saturn-5 rocket that sent Apollo 11 to the moon.
"Buran" has a great external accessibility with the American "Shuttle". Korabl poctroen Po cheme camoleta tipa "bechvoctka» c treugolnym krylom peremennoy ctrelovidnocti, imeet aerodinamicheckie organy upravleniya, rabotayuschie at pocadke pocle vozvrascheniya in plotnye cloi atmocfery - wheel napravleniya and elevony. He was able to make a controlled descent in the atmosphere with a lateral maneuver of up to 2000 kilometers.
The length of the "Buren" is 36.4 meters, the wingspan is about 24 meters, the height of the ship on the chassis is more than 16 meters. The old mass of the ship is more than 100 tons, of which 14 tons are used for fuel. In nocovoy otcek vctavlena germetichnaya tselnocvarnaya kabina for ekipazha and bolshey chacti apparatury for obecpecheniya poleta in coctave raketno-kocmicheckogo komplekca, avtonomnogo poleta nA orbite, cpucka and pocadki. The volume of the cabin is more than 70 cubic meters.
When vozvraschenii in plotnye cloi atmocfery naibolee teplonapryazhennye uchactki poverhnocti korablya rackalyayutcya do graducov 1600, zhe teplo, dohodyaschee nepocredctvenno do metallicheckoy konctruktsii korablya, ne dolzhno prevyshat 150 graducov. Therefore, "BURAN" distinguished its powerful thermal protection, providing normal temperature conditions for the design of a ship during the flight of aircraft
Heat-resistant cover made of more than 38 thousand tiles, made of special materials: quartz fiber, high-performance core, no-nonsense core Ceramic firewood has the ability to accumulate heat, without passing it to the ship's hull. The total mass of this armor was about 9 tons.
The length of the BURANA cargo compartment is about 18 meters. In its extensive cargo compartment it is possible to accommodate a payload with a mass of up to 30 tons. There it was possible to place large space vehicles - large satellites, blocks of orbital stations. The landing mass of the ship is 82 tons.
"BURAN" was used with all necessary systems and equipment for both automatic and piloted flight. This and the means of navigation and control, and radiotechnical and television systems, and automatic controllers of warm-hearted and efficient
Buran's cabin
The main engine installation, two groups of engines for maneuvering are located in the end of the tail section and in the front part of the frame.
November 18, 1988 "Buran" went on its flight into space. It was launched by the Energia launch vehicle.
After entering the near-earth orbit, "Buran" made 2 orbits around the Earth (in 205 minutes), then began its descent to Baikonur. The landing was made at a special Yubileiny airfield.
The flight took place in automatic mode, there was no crew on board. The orbital flight and landing were performed using an on-board computer and special software. Automatic flight mode was the main difference from the Space Shuttle, in which astronauts land in manual mode. The flight of Buran entered the Guinness Book of Records as unique (no one had ever landed spacecraft in a fully automatic mode).
Automatic landing of a 100-ton whopper is a very difficult thing. We did not make any hardware, only the software for the landing mode - from the moment of reaching (during descent) an altitude of 4 km to stopping on the runway. I will try to tell you very briefly how this algorithm was made.
First, the theorist writes the algorithm in a high-level language and tests it against test cases. This algorithm, which is written by one person, is "responsible" for one relatively small operation. Then it is combined into a subsystem, and it is dragged to the modeling stand. In the stand "around" the working, on-board algorithm, there are models - a model of the dynamics of the apparatus, models of executive bodies, sensor systems, etc. They are also written in a high-level language. Thus, the algorithmic subsystem is tested in the "mathematical flight".
Then the subsystems are put together and checked again. And then the algorithms are "translated" from a high-level language into the language of the on-board vehicle (BCVM). To check them, already in the hypostasis of the onboard program, there is another simulation stand, which includes an onboard computer. And around her is the same - mathematical models. They are, of course, modified compared to the models in a purely mathematical bench. The model "spins" in a general purpose mainframe. Do not forget, these were the 1980s, personal computers were just beginning and were very low-powered. It was the mainframe time, we had a twin of two EC-1061s. And for communication of an on-board vehicle with a matmodel in a universal computer, special equipment is needed, it is also needed as part of a stand for various tasks.
We called this stand semi-natural - after all, in it, besides all mathematics, there was a real on-board computer. It implemented the mode of operation of the onboard programs, very close to the real time mode. It takes a long time to explain, but for the on-board computer it was indistinguishable from the "real" real time.
Someday I'll get myself together and write how the semi-natural simulation mode works - for this and other cases. In the meantime, I just want to explain the composition of our department - the team that did all this. It had a complex department that dealt with sensors and executive systemsinvolved in our programs. There was an algorithmic department - these actually wrote onboard algorithms and worked them out on a mathematical stand. Our department was engaged in a) translation of programs into the on-board computer language, b) creation of special equipment for a semi-natural stand (here I worked) and c) programs for this equipment.
Our department even had our own designers to make documentation for the manufacture of our blocks. And there was also a department that was in charge of operating the aforementioned EC-1061 pair.
The output product of the department, and hence of the entire design bureau within the framework of the "storm" theme, was a program on magnetic tape (1980s!), Which was taken to work out further.
Further - this is the stand of the enterprise-developer of the control system. After all, it is clear that the control system of an aircraft is not only an on-board computer. This system was made by a much larger enterprise than us. They were the developers and "owners" of the on-board computer, they stuffed it with a variety of programs that perform the whole range of tasks for controlling the ship from pre-launch preparation to post-landing shutdown of systems. And for us, our landing algorithm, in that on-board computer, only a part of the computer time was allocated, in parallel (more precisely, I would say, quasi-parallel) other software systems worked. After all, if we calculate the landing trajectory, this does not mean that we no longer need to stabilize the vehicle, turn on and off all kinds of equipment, maintain thermal conditions, generate telemetry and so on, and so on and so forth ...
However, let's get back to working out the landing mode. After working out in a standard redundant on-board computer as part of the entire set of programs, this set was transported to the stand of the enterprise-developer of the Buran spacecraft. And there was a stand, called a full-size stand, in which an entire ship was involved. When running programs, he waved elevons, hummed drives and all that stuff. And the signals came from real accelerometers and gyroscopes.
Then I saw enough of all this on the Breeze-M accelerator, but for now my role was quite modest. I did not travel outside my design bureau ...
So, we passed the full-size booth. Do you think that's all? Not.
Next was the flying laboratory. This is the Tu-154, whose control system is configured so that the aircraft reacts to the control actions generated by the on-board computer, as if it were not a Tu-154, but a Buran. Of course, it is possible to quickly "return" to normal. "Buransky" was switched on only for the duration of the experiment.
The culmination of the tests were 24 flights of the Buran, made especially for this stage. It was called BTS-002, had 4 engines from the same Tu-154 and could take off from the runway itself. He sat down in the process of testing, of course, with the engines turned off, because "in the state" the spacecraft lands in the planning mode, there are no atmospheric engines on it.
The complexity of this work, or rather, our software-algorithmic complex, can be illustrated by the following. In one of the BTS-002 flights. flew "on the program" until the main landing gear touched the strip. Then the pilot took control and lowered the nose strut. Then the program turned on again and kept the device to a complete stop.
By the way, this is pretty understandable. While the apparatus is in the air, it has no restrictions on rotation around all three axes. And it revolves, as expected, around the center of mass. Here he touched the strip with the wheels of the main struts. What's happening? Roll rotation is now impossible at all. The pitch rotation is no longer around the center of mass, but around the axis passing through the points of contact of the wheels, and it is still free. And the rotation along the course is now determined in a complex way by the ratio of the steering torque from the rudder and the friction force of the wheels on the strip.
This is such a difficult regime, so radically different from both flight and run along the strip "on three points". Because when the front wheel falls into the lane, then - as in a joke: no one is spinning anywhere ...
In total, it was planned to build 5 orbital ships. In addition to Buran, the Tempest was almost ready and almost half of the Baikal. Two more ships that are in the initial stage of production have not received names. The Energiya-Buran system was unlucky - it was born at an unfortunate time for it. The Soviet economy was no longer able to fund expensive space programs. And some kind of fate pursued the cosmonauts who were preparing for flights on "Buran". Test pilots V. Bukreev and A. Lysenko died in plane crashes in 1977, even before joining the cosmonaut group. In 1980, test pilot O. Kononenko died. 1988 took the lives of A. Levchenko and A. Shchukin. After the flight of "Buran" R. Stankevichus, the co-pilot for the manned flight of the winged spacecraft, died in a plane crash. I. Volk was appointed the first pilot.
"Buran" was not lucky either. After the first and only successful flight, the ship was kept in a hangar at the Baikonur cosmodrome. On May 12, 2012, the overlap of the workshop in which the Buran and the Energia model were located collapsed. On this sad chord, the existence of the winged spacecraft, which had shown such great hopes, ended.
After the collapse of the floor
From its first launch 30 years ago to its last flight, NASA's spacecraft has seen moments of takeoff and frustration. This program has completed up to 135 flights, delivered more than 350 people and thousands of tons of materials and equipment to low-earth orbit. The flights were risky, sometimes extremely dangerous. Indeed, over the years, 14 shuttle astronauts have died.
During a visit to watch the launch of Apollo, 16 to 15 April 1972, Russian poet Yevgeny Yevtushenko (left) listens as Kennedy Space Center director Dr. Kurt H. explains the space shuttle programs 
The layout of the proposed configuration is the Shuttle wing space. The photo was taken on March 28, 1975. 
This is a Nov 6, 1975 image showing a mock spacecraft attached to a 747 launch vehicle in a wind tunnel. 
Part of the cast of the television series Star Trek took part in the first screening of America's first spaceship in Palmdale, California on September 17, 1976. On the left are Leonard Nimoy, George Takei, Forest Kelly, and James Doohan. 
An inside view of a hydrogen tank destined for the space shuttle on February 1, 1977. At 154 meters long and over 27 feet in diameter, the outer tank is the largest component of the spacecraft, the structural backbone of the entire Shuttle system. 
A technician works with sensors mounted on the back of a spaceship mockup on February 15, 1977 
At the Kennedy Space Center in Florida, this mock spacecraft, dubbed the Pathfinder, is attached to a device that can be validated on October 19, 1978. The mockup built at NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama had the overall dimensions, weight, and balance of a real space shuttle. 
The prototype NASA 747 Shuttle Carrier takes off from the dry seabed of Rogers Lake on the second of five free flights at Dryden Flight Research Center, Edwards, California, since January 1, 1977. 
Shuttle Columbia arrives at Launch Complex 39A in preparation for STS-1 mission at Kennedy Space Center, December 29, 1980. 
Astronauts John Young (left) and Robert Crippen, looking at spacecraft instrumentation at NASA Orbiter 102 Columbia, prepare the spacecraft for the orbital test flight at Kennedy Space Center on October 10, 1980. 
Flight Director Charles R. Lewis (left) examines a graphical display on a Flight Operations Control (MOCR) monitor at the Johnson Space Center Mission Control Center, April 1981. 
Two solid rocket boosters are dropped from the Columbia shuttle as a successful launch, and space travel has continued since 1975. April 12, 1981 
Shuttle Columbia on the dry bottom of Rogers Lake at Edwards AFB completed its first orbital mission on April 14, 1981 after landing. 
Space shuttle Columbia atop a NASA Boeing 747 at Edwards Air Force Base, California, November 25, 1981 
The Columbia space shuttle night launch, during the twenty-fourth mission of NASA's Shuttle space program, January 12, 1986 
Astronaut Sally Ride, STS-7 Specialist, monitors control panels in the pilot's seat of the Challenger space shuttle on June 25, 1983 
The Space Shuttle Enterprise is being transported over a slope that has been widened to avoid hitting its wings to Vandenberg Air Force Base in California on February 1, 1985. The orbiter is being transported to the space launch complex on board six specially designed 76-wheeled transporters. 
General view of a spacecraft in launch position at Space Rocket Complex (SLC) # 6, ready to launch a test to validate launch procedures at Vandenberg Air Force Base, on February 1, 1985 
The space shuttle Discovery, at the Edwards Air Force Base in California, after completing its 26th space mission. 
Christa McAuliffe tries out the seat of the flight deck commander of a shuttle simulator at Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas on September 13, 1985. McAuliffe was scheduled to make a space flight in the Challenger space shuttle in January 1986, ending in tragedy. 
Ice on launch pad 39-B equipment on January 27, 1986 at Kennedy Space Center, Florida, causing the ill-fated launch of the Challenger shuttle 
Spectators in the VIP area at Kennedy Space Center, Florida, watch the Space Shuttle Challenger ascend from pad 39-B on January 28, 1986, on its final tragic flight. 
Shuttle Challenger exploded 73 seconds after launch from the Kennedy spaceport. The corps, with a crew of seven, including the first teacher in space, was destroyed, all on board were killed 
Spectators at the Kennedy Space Center at Cape Canaveral, Florida after witnessing the explosion of the Challenger shuttle on January 28, 1986 
Space Shuttle Columbia (left), slated to take off STS-35, passes the Atlantis spacecraft on its way to Pad 39A. Atlantis, slated for mission STS-38, parked in front of the bay to repair liquid hydrogen lines 
Florida Air Force F-15C Eagle National Guard aircraft on patrol mission for the shuttle Endeavor launched from Cape Canaveral, Florida, December 5, 2001 
The nose of the space shuttle Atlantis, seen from the Russian space station Mir in STS-71 mission, June 29, 1995. 
Cosmonaut Valery Vladimirovich Polyakov, who was at the station on January 8, 1994, leaves for the opening of the spacecraft 
Specialist Bruce McCandless II, flew farther from the Challenger space shuttle than any previous astronaut February 12, 1984 photos 
Testing of the Shuttle's main engine at the Marshall Space Flight Center test facility, Huntsville, Alabama, December 22, 1993 
Astronaut Joseph R. Tanner, STS-82 Flight Specialist, walks into outer space to conduct experiments on film on February 16, 1997 
The two components of the International Space Station are interconnected on December 6, 1998. The Russian FGB, also called Zarya, is approached by the Shuttle Endeavor 
During the first war in Iraq, in April 1991, black smoke from burning oil wells in the Kuwaiti desert was seen from orbit by the Atlantis space shuttle during the STS-37 mission. The Iraqi army set fire to oil wells in Kuwait when it fled the country. 
Shuttle Endeavor (STS-134) makes its last landing at the Kennedy Space Center at Cape Canaveral, Florida on June 1, 2011. 
Puffs of smoke and steam interspersed with fiery light during the launch of the shuttle Endeavor at NASA Kennedy Space Center at 39A in July 2009. 
The external fuel tank of Shuttle ET-118, which departed in September 2006, was photographed by astronauts aboard the shuttle about 21 minutes after takeoff. 
The shuttle training model is parachuted into the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of Florida, where it will be hauled back to land, and refitted for reuse. 
Although astronauts and cosmonauts often encounter striking scenes, this unique image has an additional feature against the silhouette of the space shuttle Endeavor. 
NASA's Boeing 747 shuttle Columbia flies from Palmdale, California to Kennedy Space Center, Florida on March 1, 2001. 
The high temperatures experienced by the Space Shuttle were simulated in the tunnels at Langley in 1975 testing of thermal insulation materials to be used on the shuttles. 
Fire and rescue personnel prepare for evacuation, two "astronauts" prepare for rescue mission in Palmdale, California, April 16, 2005 
The shuttle Challenger moves through the fog on tracked tractors on its way to launch pad 39A of the Kennedy Space Center on November 30, 1982. 
The Discovery shuttle departs from Cape Canaveral on October 29. On the beach, children are watching him. 
The Hubble Space Telescope begins its separation from the Discovery shuttle on 19 February 1997 
This photo taken from Earth using a solar-filtered telescope shows the silhouette of NASA's Atlantis shuttle against the backdrop of the Sun Tuesday, May 12, 2009, from Florida. 
The silhouette of the space shuttle Columbia Commander, Kenneth Cockrall, seen from the front windows of the plane on December 7, 1996. 
The Discovery shuttle lands in the Mojave Desert on September 11, 2009 at NASA Dryden Flight Research Center at Edwards Air Force Base near Mojave, California 
The shuttle Endeavor rests on an airplane at the Ames Dryden Flight Research Foundation, Edwards, California, shortly before being flown back to Kennedy Space Center in Florida. 
The Discovery Shuttle is streaking brightly in the early morning darkness as it lifts off Launch Pad 39A on a 10-day flight to service the Hubble Space Telescope. 
At the end of the flight, the space shuttle Discovery was able to document the beginning of the second day of activity from Rabaul Volcano, on the eastern tip of New Britain. On the morning of September 19, 1994, two volcanic cones on opposite sides of the 6 km crater began to erupt into the sea. 
Space shuttle Atlantis over Earth, close to docking in orbit with the International Space Station in 2007 
After a catastrophic crash on landing, debris from Space Shuttle Columbia is visible in the sky on the morning of February 1, 2003. The orbiter and all seven crew members are killed. 
The wreckage of Columbia is laid out on the grid to determine the causes of the disaster. March 13, 2003 
Preparations for the space shuttle Discovery are slowly being assembled due to lightning strikes near Launch Pad 39A of the Kennedy Space Center in Florida on August 4, 2009. 
astronaut Robert L. Kerbeam, Jr. (left) and the European Space Agency (ESA), astronaut Christer Fuglesang, as STS-116 mission specialists, participate in the first of three planned spacewalks for the construction of the International Space Station on December 12, 2006 ... Against the backdrop of New Zealand. 
Xenon lights assist shuttle Endeavor landing at NASA Kennedy Space Center in Florida. 
The docking of the shuttle Endeavor, against the background of a night view of the Earth and the starry sky, photographed by an expedition on the International Space Station on May 28, 2011 
At Kennedy Space Center in Florida, the STS-133 crew rests from a simulated launch countdown at the 195-foot Launch Pad level 39A 
A wave of condensation, illuminated by the sun, occurred during the launch of Atlantis on STS-106 on September 8, 2001. 
International Space Station and docked shuttle Endeavor, flying at an altitude of about 220 kilometers. It's May 23, 2011 
History of the program Space Shuttle began in the late 1960s, at the height of the triumph of the US National Space Program. On June 20, 1969, two Americans, Neil Armstrong and Edwin Aldrin, landed on the moon. Having won the "lunar" race, America brilliantly proved its superiority and thereby solved its main task in space exploration, proclaimed by the President John F. Kennedy in his famous speech on May 25, 1962: "I believe that our people can set themselves the task before the end of this decade to land a man on the moon and return him safely to Earth."
Thus, on July 24, 1969, when the Apollo 11 crew returned to Earth, the American program lost its purpose, which immediately affected the revision of further plans and the reduction of appropriations for the Apollo program. And although flights to the moon continued, America faced the question: what should a man do in space next?
The fact that such a question would arise was obvious long before July 1969. And the first evolutionary attempt at an answer was natural and reasonable: NASA proposed, using a unique technique developed for the Apollo program, to expand the scope of work in space: to conduct a long expedition to the moon, build a base on its surface, create habitable space stations for regular observation of the Earth, organize factories in space, and finally begin manned exploration and exploration of Mars, asteroids and distant planets ...
Even the initial stage of this program required maintaining the cost of civil space at a level of at least $ 6 billion per year. But America - the richest country in the world - could not afford it: President L. Johnson needed money for announced social programs and for the war in Vietnam. Therefore, as early as August 1, 1968, a year before the landing on the moon, a fundamental decision was made: to limit the production of Saturn launch vehicles by the first order - 12 copies of Saturn-1V and 15 products of Saturn-5. This meant that the lunar technique would no longer be used - and from all proposals further development As a result of the Apollo program, only the Skylab experimental orbital station remained. New goals and new ones were needed technical means for human access to space, and on October 30, 1968, two NASA head centers (Manned Spacecraft Center - MSC - in Houston and Marshall Space Center - MSFC - in Huntsville) approached American space firms with a proposal to investigate the possibility of creating a reusable space system ...
Prior to that, all launch vehicles were disposable - putting the payload (PG) into orbit, they spent themselves without a trace. Spacecraft were also disposable, with the rarest exceptions in the field of manned spacecraft - the Mercury with serial numbers 2, 8 and 14 and the second Gemini flew twice. Now the task was formulated: to create a reusable system, when both the launch vehicle and the spacecraft are returned after the flight and are used repeatedly, and due to this, the cost of space transport operations will be reduced by 10 times, which was very important in conditions of budget deficit.
In February 1969, studies were ordered from four companies, in order to identify the most prepared of them for the conclusion of the contract. In July 1970, two firms had already received orders for a more detailed study. In parallel, research was carried out in the technical directorate of MSC under the leadership of Maxime Faget.
The carrier and the ship were conceived to be winged and manned. They had to start vertically, like a conventional launch vehicle. The carrier aircraft worked as the first stage of the system and after the separation of the ship landed at the airfield. At the expense of onboard fuel, the spacecraft was launched into orbit, performed a mission, left orbit and also landed "like an airplane." The system was named "Space Shuttle" - "Space Shuttle".
In September, the Task Force under the leadership of Vice President S. Agnu, formed to formulate new goals in space, proposed two options: "to the maximum" - an expedition to Mars, a manned station in lunar orbit and a heavy near-earth station for 50 people, served by spacecraft reusable. "At the minimum" - only the space station and the space shuttle. But President Nixon rejected all options because even the cheapest demanded $ 5 billion a year.
NASA faced a difficult choice: it was necessary either to start a new major development, allowing to preserve personnel and accumulated experience, or to announce the termination of the manned program. It was decided to insist on the creation of a shuttle, but to present it not as a transport ship for assembling and servicing the space station (keeping it in reserve, however), but as a system that can make a profit and recoup investments by launching satellites into orbit on a commercial basis. An economic assessment carried out in 1970 showed that if a number of conditions are met (at least 30 shuttle flights per year, low operating costs and a complete rejection of disposable carriers), payback is in principle achievable.
Pay attention to this very important point in understanding the history of the shuttle. At the stage of conceptual studies of the appearance of the new transport system, a fundamental approach to design was replaced: instead of creating an apparatus for certain purposes within the allotted funds, the developers began at any cost, by "pulling the ears" of economic calculations and future operating conditions, to save the existing shuttle project, saving the created production facilities and jobs. In other words, it was not the shuttle that was designed for the tasks, but the tasks and economic justification were adjusted to its project in order to save the industry and the American manned astronautics. This approach was “pushed through” in Congress by the “space” lobby, which consisted of senators from the “aerospace” states, primarily Florida and California.
It was this approach that confused the Soviet experts, who did not understand the true motives in making the decision to develop the shuttle. After all, verification calculations of the declared economic efficiency The space shuttle carried out in the USSR showed that the costs of its creation and operation will never pay off (and it turned out that way!), and the estimated Earth-Orbit-Earth cargo traffic was not provided with real or projected payloads. Not knowing about future plans to create a large space station, our experts formed the opinion that the Americans are preparing for something - after all, an apparatus was being created, the capabilities of which significantly anticipated all foreseeable goals in the use of space ... "Oil on the fire" of mistrust, fears and uncertainties were added by the involvement of the US Department of Defense in determining the future appearance of the shuttle. But it could not be otherwise, because the rejection of disposable launch vehicles meant that the shuttles should also be launched by all promising devices of the Ministry of Defense, the CIA and the US National Security Agency. The demands of the military boiled down to the following:
- At first , the shuttle was supposed to be able to launch into orbit the KH-II optical-electronic reconnaissance satellite (a military prototype of the Hubble space telescope), which was developed in the first half of the 1970s, providing a resolution on the ground when shooting from orbit no worse than 0.3 m ; and a family of cryogenic interorbital tugs. The geometrical and weight dimensions of the secret satellite and tugs determined the dimensions of the cargo compartment - a length of at least 18 m and a width (diameter) of at least 4.5 meters. The shuttle's ability to deliver cargo weighing up to 29,500 kg to orbit and to return up to 14,500 kg from space to Earth was determined in a similar way. All conceivable civilian payloads fit within these parameters without problems. However, Soviet experts, who closely followed the "tying" of the shuttle project and did not know about the new American spy satellite, the chosen dimensions of the useful compartment and the shuttle's carrying capacity could only be explained by the desire of the "American military" to be able to inspect and, if necessary, shoot (more precisely, capture) from orbit Soviet manned stations of the DOS series (long-term orbital stations) developed by TsKBEM and military OPS (manned orbital stations) Almaz developed by OKB-52 V. Chelomey. By the way, an automatic cannon designed by Nudelman-Richter was installed on the OPS, "just in case".
- Secondly , the military demanded that the projected value of the lateral maneuver during the descent of the orbital ship in the atmosphere be increased from the initial 600 km to 2000-2500 km for the convenience of landing at a limited number of military airfields. To launch into near-polar orbits (with an inclination of 56º ... 104º), the Air Force decided to build its own technical, launch and landing complexes at Vandenberg airbase in California.
The military's payload requirements predetermined the size of the orbital ship and the size of the launch mass of the system as a whole. For the increased lateral maneuver, significant lift was required at hypersonic speeds - this is how a double sweep wing and powerful thermal protection appeared on the ship.
In 1971, it was finally clear that NASA would not receive the $ 9-10 billion needed to create a fully reusable system. This is the second major turning point in the history of the shuttle. Prior to that, the designers still had two alternatives - to spend a lot of money on development and build a reusable space system with a low cost of each launch (and operation in general), or try to save money at the design stage and transfer costs into the future by creating an expensive to operate system of for the high cost of a single launch. The high cost of launching in this case was due to the presence of disposable elements in the ISS. To save the project, the designers chose the second path, abandoning the “expensive” design of a reusable system in favor of a “cheap” semi-reusable one, thereby putting the final end to all plans for the future payback of the system.
In March 1972, on the basis of the Houston project MSC-040C, the appearance of the shuttle, which we know today, was approved: launching solid-fuel boosters, a disposable tank of propellants and an orbital ship with three propulsion engines, which had lost its jet engines for landing approach. The development of such a system, which reuses everything except the external tank, was estimated at $ 5.15 billion.
It was on these conditions that Nixon announced the creation of the shuttle in January 1972. The election race was already under way, and the Republicans were happy to enlist the support of voters in the "aerospace" states. July 26, 1972 Space Division transport systems North American Rockwell was awarded a $ 2.6 billion contract for the design of an orbital vehicle, two bench and two flight products. The development of the ship's propulsion engines was entrusted to Rocketdyne - a division of the same Rockwell, the external fuel tank - to Martin Marietta, accelerators - to United Space Boosters Inc. and the actual solid propellant engines - at Morton Thiokol. On the NASA side, the MSC (orbital stage) and MSFC (other components) provided guidance and oversight.
Initially, the flight ships were designated OV-101, OV-102, and so on. Production of the first two began at US Air Force Plant N42 in Palmdale in June 1974. The OV-101 was launched on September 17, 1976 and was named Enterprise after the starship from the science fiction television series Star Trek. After horizontal flight tests, it was planned to convert it into an orbital ship, but OV-102 was to be the first to rise into orbit.
During tests of the Enterprise - atmospheric in 1977 and vibration in 1978 - it became clear that the wings and the middle part of the fuselage must be significantly strengthened. These solutions were partially implemented on the OV-102 during the assembly process, but the ship's carrying capacity had to be limited to 80% of the nominal. The second flight copy was needed already full, capable of launching heavy satellites, and in order to strengthen the design of the OV-101, it would have to be almost completely disassembled. At the end of 1978, a solution was born: it would be faster and cheaper to bring the STA-099 static testing machine to flight condition. On January 5 and 29, 1979, NASA awarded Rockwell International contracts for the revision of STA-099 into the OV-099 flight ship ($ 596.6 million in 1979 prices), for the modification of the Columbia after flight tests ($ 28 million) and for construction OV-103 and OV-104 ($ 1653.3 million). And on January 25, all four orbital stages received their own names: OV-102 became Columbia, OV-099 was named Challenger, OV-103 was named Discovery and OV-104 was named " Atlantis "(Atlantis). Subsequently, to replenish the shuttle fleet after the death of the Challenger, the OV-105 Endeavor was built.
So what is "Space Shuttle"?
Structurally, the Space Shuttle reusable transport space system (MTSS) consists of two salvage solid-fuel boosters, which are actually Stage I, and an orbital spacecraft with three propulsion oxygen-hydrogen engines and an outboard fuel compartment forming Stage II, while the fuel compartment is the only one-time use element of the entire system. It is envisaged to use solid-propellant boosters twenty times, orbital spacecraft a hundred times, and oxygen-hydrogen engines are designed for 55 flights.
When designing, it was assumed that such an MTKS with a launch mass of 1995-2050 tons would be able to launch into an orbit with an inclination of 28.5 degrees. payload with a mass of 29.5 tons to a sun-synchronous orbit - 14.5 tons and return a payload with a mass of 14.5 tons to Earth from orbit. It was also assumed that the number of MTKS launches could be increased to 55-60 per year. In the first flight, the launch mass of the Space Shuttle MTKS was 2022 tons, the mass of the manned orbital vehicle during launch into orbit was 94.8 tons, and during landing - 89.1 tons.
The development of such a system is a very complex and time-consuming problem, as evidenced by the fact that today the indicators for total costs on the creation of the system, the cost of its launch and the timing of its creation. So, the cost has increased from 5.2 billion dollars. (in 1971 prices) up to 10.1 billion dollars. (in 1982 prices), the launch cost - from 10.5 million dollars. up to 240 million dollars It was not possible to meet the deadline for the first experimental flight planned for 1979.
In total, seven shuttles have been built to date, five ships were intended for space flights, two of which were lost in disasters.